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HUNTING  AND  THE  SECOND  AMENDMENT
Joseph Blocher*
ABSTRACT
Debates about the meaning and scope of the Second Amendment have traditionally focused
on whether it protects the keeping and bearing of arms for self-defense, prevention of tyranny,
maintenance of the militia, or some combination of those three things.  But roughly half of Ameri-
can gun-owners identify hunting or sport shooting as their primary reason for owning a gun.
And while much public rhetoric suggests that these activities fall within the scope of the Second
Amendment, some of the most committed gun-rights advocates insist that the Amendment “ain’t
about hunting” and that, no matter their heritage and value, such activities are constitutionally
irrelevant.  This Article argues that these advocates are mostly correct, and that hunting and
recreational uses of arms have, at best, a tenuous claim to constitutional protection.  This conclu-
sion has implications not only for the potential regulation of hunting and shooting sports, but for
broader issues such as determining which arms are “in common use” and therefore protected by
the Second Amendment.  At a more general level, it suggests that an important and influential
part of American gun culture—populated by tens of millions of guns and gun owners—is simul-
taneously protected and regulated without the direct involvement of the Second Amendment.
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s decision in District of Columbia v. Heller affirmed
the existence of an “individual” right to keep and bear arms for certain non-
militia purposes,1 and clarified that this right is “not unlimited” and does not
“protect the right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation, just as
we do not read the First Amendment to protect the right of citizens to speak
for any purpose.”2  In the wake of Heller, one of the central difficulties in Sec-
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1 554 U.S. 570, 602 (2008).
2 Id. at 595.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3047 (2010) (“It is impor-
tant to keep in mind that Heller . . . recognized that the right to keep and bear arms is not
‘a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for
whatever purpose.’”).
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ond Amendment law and scholarship is determining which gun-related activ-
ities are covered by the right to “keep and bear arms.”  The private possession
of a handgun for self-defense in one’s home is generally covered, while the
use of a gun to rob a bank is certainly not.3  Separating these and other types
of keeping and bearing has become central to Second Amendment analysis.4
And yet very little attention has been given to what traditionally were,
and might still be, the most common uses of arms.5  Hunting and recrea-
tional uses like target shooting and “plinking”6 have long been the primary
reasons for gun ownership in the United States.7  And although self-protec-
tion might recently have eclipsed recreation as the most common reason for
gun ownership8—apparently due both to the increasing ownership of guns
3 Heller, 554 U.S. at 636–37 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Guns are used to hunt, for self-
defense, to commit crimes, for sporting activities, and to perform military duties.  The
Second Amendment plainly does not protect the right to use a gun to rob a bank; it is
equally clear that it does encompass the right to use weapons for certain military purposes.
Whether it also protects the right to possess and use guns for nonmilitary purposes like
hunting and personal self-defense is the question presented by this case.” (emphasis
omitted)).
4 See, e.g., Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second Amend-
ment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278 (2009) (arguing for a “home-bound” interpretation of the
Second Amendment right); Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for
Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1515–34
(2009) (evaluating the constitutionality of prohibitions on gun possession in certain
places); Jonathan Meltzer, Note, Open Carry for All: Heller and Our Nineteenth-Century Second
Amendment, 123 YALE L.J. 1486 (2014) (arguing that open carrying is covered by the Second
Amendment, but that concealed carrying is not).
5 Few scholars or commentators have analyzed in any depth whether the Second
Amendment protects hunting.  As noted below, some have said in passing that Heller pro-
tects the right to hunt. See infra notes 109–12.  Others have based the argument on state
constitutional guarantees, Stephen P. Halbrook, The Constitutional Right to Hunt: New Recog-
nition of an Old Liberty in Virginia, 19 WM & MARY BILL RTS. J. 197, 229–33 (2010), or other
legal devices like public trust doctrine, Darren K. Cottriel, Comment, The Right to Hunt in
the Twenty-First Century: Can the Public Trust Doctrine Save an American Tradition?, 27 PAC. L.J.
1235 (1996).
6 Plinking refers to shooting at informal targets like tin cans.
7 PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, Guns in America: National Survey on Private Ownership
and Use of Firearms, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN BRIEF, May 1997, at 2 (“The
most common motivation for owning firearms was recreation.”); see ROBERT J. SPITZER, THE
POLITICS OF GUN CONTROL 57 (4th ed. 2008) (“By far the most common reasons for gun
ownership are hunting and related recreational uses, a fact consistent with the prevalence
of long guns over handguns.”); Jan E. Dizard et al., The War over Guns: Introduction: Numbers
Don’t Count, in GUNS IN AMERICA 165, 166 (Jan E. Dizard et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter
GUNS IN AMERICA] (estimating 225 million guns in private possession in the late 1980s, and
noting that “[m]ost of these firearms are rifles and shotguns primarily used for recreation:
hunting and target shooting”).
8 In a Pew Research study conducted in February 2013, approximately 39% of gun
owners listed hunting or sport shooting as their primary reason for owning a gun; in 1999,
the combined figure was 57%.  The same study found that 48% of gun owners listed pro-
tection as their primary reason for ownership in 2013, up from 26% in 1999. Why Own a
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for self-defense and the declining popularity of hunting9—millions, and per-
haps tens of millions, of Americans identify themselves as hunters every
year.10  That number dwarfs even the highest estimates of people who
engage in armed self-defense annually.11  Beyond the numbers, hunting has
long had a special cultural salience in the United States,12 and is especially
treasured in rural communities where gun ownership and gun culture are
most prevalent.13
This Article analyzes the Second Amendment status of hunting and
other recreational uses of guns (referred to collectively as “hunting” except
where greater specificity seems required) both as a matter of constitutional
rhetoric and as a matter of constitutional doctrine.  Though the focus is on
hunting specifically, the analysis demonstrates a more general point: that to
fully measure the Second Amendment’s influence on gun regulation, one
Gun? Protection Is Now Top Reason, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Mar. 12, 2013), http://www.people-
press.org/2013/03/12/why-own-a-gun-protection-is-now-top-reason/.
9 Sabrina Tavernise & Robert Gebeloff, Share of Homes with Guns Shows 4-Decade
Decline, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/10/us/rate-of-gun-
ownership-is-down-survey-shows.html (“According to an analysis of the [2012 General
Social Survey], only a quarter of men in 2012 said they hunted, compared with about 40
percent when the question was asked in 1977.”).
10 SPITZER, supra note 7, at 9 (“Today, approximately 14 million persons (sixteen years
of age and older), about 6 percent of the country’s population, identify themselves as
hunters.”); see also Matthew DeBell, Recreational Uses of Guns, in 2 GUNS IN AMERICAN SOCI-
ETY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HISTORY, POLITICS, CULTURE, AND THE LAW 494 (Gregg Lee Carter
ed., 2002) (noting that “[a]bout half of gun owners, and about 12 percent of adults, take
part” in hunting or target shooting each year).  Moreover, “most people who have acquired
guns for self-protection are also hunters and target shooters.”  Philip J. Cook et al., Gun
Control After Heller: Threats and Sideshows from a Social Welfare Perspective, 56 UCLA L. REV.
1041, 1047 (2009); see also PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, GUNS IN AMERICA: RESULTS OF A
NATIONAL COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY ON FIREARMS OWNERSHIP AND USE 39 tbl.4.6 (1996).
11 Compare Gary Kleck & Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: The Prevalence and Nature
of Self-Defense with a Gun, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 150, 184 tbl.2 (1995) (estimating 2.5
million defensive gun uses per year), with MICHAEL R. RAND, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUNS
AND CRIME: HANDGUN VICTIMIZATION, FIREARM SELF-DEFENSE, AND FIREARM THEFT 1–2
(1994) (estimating 80,000 uses).
12 Franklin Foer & Chris Hughes, Barack Obama Is Not Pleased, NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 27,
2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112190/obama-interview-2013-sit-down-presi
dent (“[I]f you grew up and your dad gave you a hunting rifle when you were ten, and you
went out and spent the day with him and your uncles, and that became part of your fam-
ily’s traditions, you can see why you’d be pretty protective of that.” (quoting President
Obama)).
13 Gary Langer, Some Gun Measures Broadly Backed but the Politics Show an Even Split,
LANGER RESEARCH (Mar. 12, 2013), http://www.langerresearch.com/uploads/1147a2Gun
Control.pdf (reporting that gun ownership is “nearly doubly common in rural compared
with urban areas”); Chuck Raasch, In Gun Debate, It’s Urban vs. Rural, USA TODAY (Feb. 27,
2013, 12:26 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/02/27/guns-
ingrained-in-rural-existence/1949479/ (“A compilation of December [2012] Gallup polls
showed that rural Americans—roughly one-sixth of the population—are more than twice
as likely to have a gun in the home than those living in large cities.”).
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must consider not only its relatively limited doctrinal impact,14 but its enor-
mous rhetorical and political power.15  Constitutional rhetoric has not only
dominated the political debate over gun regulation in the United States—
sometimes with little connection to the substance of constitutional law—but
has shaped that doctrine in fundamentally important ways.16
The first Part of this Article therefore begins by analyzing popular consti-
tutional rhetoric regarding the Second Amendment and the use of guns for
hunting and recreation.17  “Gun rights talk” has long played a massive role in
defining the scope and stringency of gun regulation in the United States,18
and its content is usually predictable: gun-rights advocates celebrate the Sec-
ond Amendment as a matter of law and rhetoric, while gun regulation advo-
cates downplay the Amendment’s doctrinal scope and fight its political
relevance.  When it comes to hunting and recreation, however, the tradi-
tional battle lines consistently get crossed in interesting ways.  Gun regulation
advocates—including many liberal politicians—go to great lengths to estab-
14 Prior to the DC Circuit’s decision in Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 395
(D.C. Cir. 2007), aff’d sub nom. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), no
federal court of appeals in the country had ever struck down a gun control law on Second
Amendment grounds.  Clark Neily, District of Columbia v. Heller: The Second Amendment Is
Back, Baby, 2007–2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 127, 140.  Even after Heller, the vast majority of
Second Amendment claims have failed. See Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer’s Triumph in the
Third Battle over the Second Amendment, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703, 707 (2012) (noting that
lower courts have largely embraced a restrained approach “that leads to all but the most
drastic restrictions on guns being upheld”).
15 See Spitzer, supra note 7, at 18 (“[A]n understanding of the Second Amendment
and its consequences is essential precisely because it is a touchstone of the gun debate.”);
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, Continuity and Change in the American Gun Debate, in GUNS, CRIME,
AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 39 (Bernard E. Harcourt ed. 2003) (“The Second Amend-
ment’s language describing a ‘right of the people to bear arms’ has always played an
important symbolic role in the rhetoric of opposition to gun controls, but the Second
Amendment has been considered a dead letter as a potential obstacle to state and federal
gun laws.”); Frederick Schauer, The Constitution of Fear, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 203, 204 n.1
(1995) (“[T]he existence of the Second Amendment has legitimated a certain rhetoric
and politics that have made gun control more difficult than would otherwise have been the
case.”).
16 See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Hel-
ler, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 194 (2008) (arguing that the “individual rights” interpretation
of the Second Amendment was a product of contemporary constitutional deliberation,
rather than “one epochal act of eighteenth-century lawmaking”).
17 My interest is in armed hunting and recreation, though for the sake of simplicity I
will generally refer simply to “hunting.”  It is of course possible to protect a right to hunt
that does not specifically include a right to do so with arms—most state constitutional
guarantees of the “right to hunt” do exactly that. See Halbrook, supra note 5, at 229–33 R
(listing thirteen state provisions that protect a right to hunt, and seven that protect a right
to hunt with arms).  Since the publication of Halbrook’s article, at least three more states
have adopted right-to-hunt provisions. State “Right to Hunt and Fish” Protections, NAT’L
SHOOTING SPORTS FOUND. (June 19, 2013), https://www.nssf.org/factsheets/PDF/
StateRighttoHunFish.pdf.
18 See generally Joseph Blocher, Gun Rights Talk, 94 B.U. L. REV. 813 (2014).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-1\NDL103.txt unknown Seq: 5  8-DEC-15 16:46
2015] hunting  and  the  second  amendment 137
lish their bona fides as hunters,19 swear fealty to hunters’ “rights,”20 and
carve out protections in firearms laws for sporting weapons.21  Meanwhile,
gun-rights advocates insist that the Second Amendment “ain’t about hunt-
ing.”22  Chris Cox, Executive Director of the NRA Institute for Legislative
Action, represents the position well: “I’m a hunter myself, but the Second
Amendment has really nothing to do with hunting.”23
Rhetorically, then, hunting seems to draw support from those generally
regarded as foes of the Second Amendment, while many gun-rights support-
ers would deny constitutional coverage to their apparent political allies.  This
puzzle is interesting and important in its own right.  And it is especially signif-
icant because Second Amendment rhetoric has so much influence over polit-
ics and doctrine.
The second Part of the Article turns to the doctrinal arguments.  It con-
cludes that gun-rights supporters’ rhetoric largely reflects a better reading of
law and history—the case for Second Amendment coverage of hunting and
recreation is tenuous.  There are at least two major arguments in support of
hunting’s constitutional salience: that hunting is directly included in the
meaning of “keep and bear arms,” and that it is instrumentally or penum-
brally protected as an aid to “core” Second Amendment interests like self-
defense.  Neither of these arguments yields much fruit.
As a doctrinal matter, the argument for direct coverage of hunting rests
largely on Heller’s statement that “[t]he prefatory clause does not suggest that
preserving the militia was the only reason Americans valued the ancient
right; most undoubtedly thought it even more important for self-defense and
hunting.”24  But the Court offered no support for this apparently offhand
remark,25 and there is little evidence that the framers, ratifiers, or general
public either intended or believed the Second Amendment to cover hunt-
ing.26  Indeed, even the reaction to the notorious “game laws” was not pre-
mised on support for a right to hunt while armed.27
Stronger arguments can be made that hunting is constitutionally pro-
tected because it is instrumental to the Second Amendment’s core values, or
19 See infra notes 37–40, 241–42 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 41–52 and accompanying text.
21 See Anders Walker, Shotguns, Weddings, and Lunch Counters: Why Cultural Frames Mat-
ter to Constitutional Law, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 345, 366 (2011); see also Preston K. Covey,
Sporting Purposes Test, in 2 GUNS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 548–52 (Gregg Lee Carter ed., 2002).
22 See infra Section I.B.
23 Talk of the Nation: Analysis: Politics of Guns and the Gun Industry (National Public
Radio broadcast May 15, 2003).
24 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008).
25 David C. Williams, Death to Tyrants: District of Columbia v. Heller and the Uses of
Guns, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 641, 647 (2008) [hereinafter Williams, Death to Tyrants] (“[I]t is
entirely unclear how hunting entered the scene, as the Court offers no support for the idea
that hunting comes within the Amendment’s ambit.”).
26 See infra Section II.A.
27 See infra subsection II.A.2.
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falls within its penumbras.28  For example, armed hunting and recreation
might make a person better able to use guns for core Second Amendment
purposes like self-defense.  Hunting might therefore have some degree of
constitutional salience.29  But as with other constitutional rights, the fact that
an activity aids the exercise of a core constitutional right does not necessarily
mean that it gets any constitutional protection,30 let alone the same level as
the core right.31  Accordingly, even if hunting has some functional relation-
ship to the core of the Second Amendment, that might not mean much as a
doctrinal or practical matter.
The conclusion that hunting has limited, if any, Second Amendment
protection carries with it some significant doctrinal implications for gun reg-
ulation targeting hunting, hunters, and hunting weapons.  For example, the
Supreme Court in Heller concluded that weapons can be banned if they are
not “in common use”32 for lawful purposes like self-defense.33  Given hunt-
ing’s tenuous constitutional salience, it is unclear whether hunting weapons
28 Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Second Amendment Penumbras: Some Preliminary Observations,
85 S. CAL. L. REV. 247, 249 (2012) [hereinafter Reynolds, Second Amendment Penumbras]
(suggesting that “the auxiliary protections that might matter most [to the Second Amend-
ment right of self-defense] would be those that would make th[e] right practicable in the
real world”); cf. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (“[N]ude dancing
of the kind sought to be performed here is expressive conduct within the outer perimeters
of the First Amendment, though we view it as only marginally so.”).
29 See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration
of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1769–72 (2004).
30 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35–36 (1973) (dismissing
appellees’ contention that education is a fundamental right because it is essential to effec-
tive exercise of First Amendment freedoms, noting that “we have never presumed to pos-
sess either the ability or the authority to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective
speech” (emphasis omitted)).
31 See, e.g., United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1137–38 (9th Cir. 2013) (describ-
ing a two-step inquiry under which standard of review varies depending on how close the
law comes to the core of the Second Amendment right, and degree to which the law bur-
dens that right); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[L]aws
restricting activity lying closer to the margins of the Second Amendment right . . . may be
more easily justified.  How much more easily depends on the relative severity of the burden
and its proximity to the core of the right.”); United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 812 (7th
Cir. 2009) (“We are not suggesting that keeping and bearing firearms for hunting falls
outside the scope of the Second Amendment . . . . We make this observation only to clarify
that . . . this case does not strike at the heart of the Second Amendment right as explicated
in Heller.”), vacated on other grounds by United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010)
(en banc).
32 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008) (noting “another important
limitation on the right to keep and carry arms”—that only “the sorts of weapons . . . ‘in
common use at the time’” are protected (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179
(1939))).  The Court grounded the common use test in historical tradition. Id. (“[T]hat
limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of ‘dan-
gerous and unusual weapons.’” (citation omitted)); see also, e.g., United States v. Henry,
688 F.3d 637, 640 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2012).
33 Heller, 554 U.S. at 629 (striking down a DC ordinance on the basis that it effectively
banned handguns, “the quintessential self-defense weapon”).
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should be counted for purposes of this test.  And that could be relevant for
the constitutional status of AR–15 “assault rifles,” whose commonness
appears to be based on their use for hunting.
At a more general level, clarifying the relationship between hunting and
the Second Amendment may suggest hope for the frequently dispiriting gun
debate.  This Article aims to show that an enormous amount of gun-related
activity falls outside the scope of the Second Amendment.  Indeed, gun-rights
supporters have long argued as much.  And yet even in the Amendment’s
absence, our basic mechanisms of law and politics seem perfectly capable of
both regulating and protecting the recreational use of guns, which account
for roughly half of gun ownership.34  Hunting is subject to regulation, to be
sure,35 but it is also widely permitted.  For many involved in the gun debate,
this state of affairs—freedom to use guns for certain purposes, modest safety
regulations, political assurances, and limited demands on the Second
Amendment—is close to an ideal.  At the very least, it suggests that the Sec-
ond Amendment’s doctrinal shadow is smaller, and political compromise
more feasible, than many or observers or veterans of the debate might
suspect.
I. HUNTING AND GUN-RIGHTS TALK
The Second Amendment has significantly shaped the scope and
strength of gun regulation in the United States.  But its influence cannot be
measured solely by doctrinal tests, nor the number of times it has been suc-
cessfully invoked in court, because its greatest power is rhetorical—it helps
keep gun laws from being passed in the first place.  Within that rhetoric,
hunting occupies a uniquely fraught position.  It is described both as a quin-
tessential, laudable form of arms-bearing and as having nothing at all to do
with the Second Amendment.  This Part explores and evaluates these two
views.  For ease of reference, they can be called the “pro-hunting” and “anti-
hunting” views, though of course the pro- and anti-refer only to their rela-
tionship to the Second Amendment.  Those who espouse them may oppose
(or support) the activity of hunting even while arguing that it is (or is not)
covered by the Amendment.
34 See Brannon P. Denning & Michael B. Kent, Jr., Anti-Anti-Evasion in Constitutional
Law, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 397, 424 (2014) (arguing that the Supreme Court will decline
to create anti-evasion doctrines where it believes “that there are robust political protec-
tions . . . that sufficiently police the constitutional boundaries and prevent governmental
overreaching”).
35 The extent of hunting regulation has become a talking point for gun regulation
advocates.  Pema Levy, Why Gun Control Backers Love to Talk About Duck Hunting, TALKING
POINTS MEMO (Jan. 30, 2013, 10:05 AM), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/dc/why-gun-
control-backers-love-to-talk-about-duck-hunting (“Federal law prohibits me from having
more than three shells in my shotgun when I’m duck hunting.  So federal law provides
more protection for the ducks than it does for citizens.” (quoting Rep. Mike Thompson
(D-CA))).
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A. Rhetorical Support for a Right to Hunt with Arms
Winning over hunters and recreational shooters is part of the American
political playbook.  Politicians often go to great and sometimes comical
lengths to tout their own experiences, enjoyment, and prowess with regard to
hunting and shooting sports.  Mitt Romney, for example, claimed to have
been a “hunter pretty much all my life,”36 though he had only been hunting
twice: once as a child, and once just prior to the campaign with some
donors.37  Though Barack Obama has expressed support for Heller and
described hunting as “part of a cherished national heritage,”38 his relation-
ship with the hunting community has been somewhat fraught, a point driven
home by the reaction to his comment that some Americans “get bitter, they
cling to guns or religion or antipathy to people who aren’t like them or anti-
immigrant sentiment or anti-trade sentiment as a way to explain their frustra-
tions.”39  When President Obama later claimed to go skeet-shooting “all the
time” at Camp David, he was roundly mocked by gun-rights advocates.40
Sometimes comments like this are simple political posturing.  But politi-
cians often take the further step of describing hunting as a “right” protected
36 Michael Luo, Is Romney a Hunter? Depends on What Hunt Is, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/06/us/politics/06hunt.html.
37 Id.
38 Jacob Sullum, Obama Still Thinks the Second Amendment Is About Hunting, REASON.COM
(July 26, 2012, 12:42 PM), http://reason.com/blog/2012/07/26/obama-still-thinks-the-
second-amendment (“I, like most Americans, believe that the Second Amendment guaran-
tees an individual the right to bear arms.  And we recognize the traditions of gun owner-
ship that passed on from generation to generation—that hunting and shooting are part of
a cherished national heritage.” (quoting Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, The White
House, Remarks by the President at the National Urban League Convention (July 25, 2012,
8:00 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/07/25/remarks-president-
national-urban-league-convention)).
39 Jeff Zeleny, Obama Remarks Called ‘Out of Touch’, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2008), http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/04/12/us/politics/12campaign.html (quoting Mayhill Fowler,
Obama: No Surprise that Hard-Pressed Pennsylvanians Turn Bitter, HUFFINGTON POST: THE
BLOG (Nov. 17, 2008, 10:07 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mayhill-fowler/obama-
no-surprise-that-ha_b_96188.html); see also Montana Leaders Decry Comments on Small Town
America, U.S. FED. NEWS, Apr. 15, 2008 (quoting letter from Montana politicians:
“Montanans are hunters.  Many Montanans feel the Second Amendment is a part of our
heritage as sportsmen and recreationists.  It is not something we ‘cling to’ out of
bitterness.”).
40 Brad Knickerbocker, Obama Skeet Shooting: NRA Says It’s a Ploy to Confiscate Guns,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 3, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/20
13/0203/Obama-skeet-shooting-NRA-says-it-s-a-ploy-to-confiscate-guns (“One picture [of
the President trap-shooting] does not erase a lifetime of supporting every gun ban and
every gun-control scheme imaginable.” (quoting NRA spokesman Andrew Arulanandam)).
Critics went so far as to question the veracity of photos of President Obama shooting at
Camp David. See, e.g., Michael Harlin, Seven Reasons Why It’s a Photoshop, AM. THINKER (Feb.
3, 2013), http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2013/02/seven_reasons_why_its_a_
photo-opp_3.html#ixzz2JqSvYE3R (“If he’s shooting skeet then I’m Daffy Duck.”); Emily
Miller, Obama’s Browning Shotgun, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2013, 4:37 PM), http://
www.washingtontimes.com/blog/guns/2013/feb/2/miller-obamas-browning-shotgun/.
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by the Second Amendment,41 echoing and perhaps encouraging the popular
belief that the Second Amendment protects hunting.42  As Reva Siegel notes,
the 1972 Republican platform promised to “[s]afeguard the right of responsi-
ble citizens to collect, own, and use firearms for legitimate purposes, includ-
ing hunting, target shooting and self-defense.”43  Romney pledged support
for the hunting “right” decades later.44  This trope is not limited to conserva-
tives playing to their base; it is also invoked by Democrats who are unlikely
ever to win points with the NRA.45  Bill Clinton, whose bona fides as a hunter
are probably more secure than Romney’s or Obama’s,46 repeatedly referred
41 See, e.g., 140 CONG. REC. H3059 (daily ed. May 5, 1994) (statement of Rep. Hutto)
(“The NRA should take the lead in coming up with a national plan to reduce the availabil-
ity of guns and level of violence in America while maintaining the constitutional right of
Americans to hunt and to protect their homes.”); Steve Goldstein, Despite Tragedy, Congress
Cautious About Gun Laws, PHILA. INQUIRER (Apr. 22, 2007), http://articles.philly.com/2007-
04-22/news/25242554_1_gun-laws-gun-control-legislation-gun-control (“We need to
respect the Second Amendment guarantees for recreational use, such as hunting.” (quot-
ing Rep. Joe Stesak (D-PA))); Vin Suprynowicz, Horsford and ‘Military-Designed’ Weapons, LAS
VEGAS REV.-J. (Jan. 27, 2013, 2:11 AM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/vin-suprynowicz/
horsford-and-military-designed-weapons (“I support the Second Amendment and the right
of individuals to bear arms for recreation, hunting or self-defense.” (quoting Rep. Steven
Horsford (D-NV))).
42 Tim Donaghy, The Right to Bear Arms, 28 VT. B.J. 67, 67 (2002) (“The Second
Amendment, the Right to Bear Arms, has affected my life because I like to hunt and
shoot. . . . Without the Second Amendment I would not be able to hunt, shoot or own
firearms.”); George V. Barr, Letter to the Editor, Gun Laws and Violence, L.A. TIMES (Sept.
30, 1993), http://articles.latimes.com/1993-09-30/local/me-40355_1_gun-control-gun-
laws-work-strictest-gun (“We the people have the right, under the Second Amendment, to
own firearms, whether for recreational shooting, competition, hunting, or self-defense.”).
43 Siegel, supra note 16, at 215 (alteration in original) (quoting Republican Nat’l Con- R
vention, Republican Party Platform of 1972, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Aug. 21,
1972), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25842).
44 Mitt Romney on the Second Amendment, MITT ROMNEY CENT., http://mittromneycen-
tral.com/on-the-issues/second-amendment/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2015) (“I do support the
right of individuals to bear arms, whether for hunting purposes or for protection purposes
or any other reasons.  That’s the right that people have.” (quoting Mitt Romney, Transcript
The Republican Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/24/
us/politics/24text-debate.html)).
45 Andrew J. McClurg, Sound-Bite Gun Fights: Three Decades of Presidential Debating About
Firearms, 73 UMKC L. REV. 1015, 1019 (2005) (“It is popular among pro-gun control Demo-
crats to tout their ‘sportsmen’ credentials.”); see also Andrew D. Herz, Gun Crazy: Constitu-
tional False Consciousness and Dereliction of Dialogic Responsibility, 75 B.U. L. REV. 57, 123
(1995) (“During a 1990 ABC program on the gun control issue, long-time NRA opponent
Senator Howard Metzenbaum assured one woman that he would ‘protect [her] right’ to
continue using guns in sporting competitions.” (alteration in original) (quoting ABC
News/Time Forum: Guns (ABC television broadcast, Jan. 24, 1990))).
46 Gwen Ifill, Clinton Hunts, Making Point on Guns, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 1993), http://
www.nytimes.com/1993/12/28/us/clinton-hunts-making-point-on-guns.html (reporting
that President Clinton “renew[ed] his sportsman’s credentials” during a duck hunting
trip).
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to the “right” to hunt.47  Al Gore did the same.48  During his campaign for
President, John Kerry frequently invoked hunting and the Second Amend-
ment: “I am a hunter.  I’m a gun owner.  I’ve been a hunter since I was a
kid—12, 13 years old.  And I respect the Second Amendment, and I will not
tamper with the Second Amendment.”49  NRA Executive Vice President
Wayne LaPierre nevertheless declared that “John Kerry is the most anti-gun,
anti-hunting presidential nominee in American history.”50  Arguing in favor
of hunting easements, New York Senator Charles Schumer similarly sug-
gested that hunting is protected by the constitution: “I’m a firm believer in
the right to bear arms . . . . Why shouldn’t I be?  The Second Amendment is
as important as the First, the Third and all the others.”51  The NRA neverthe-
less described Schumer as “The Criminal’s Best Friend in Congress.”52
47 See, e.g., Clinton Campaigns for Weapons Ban in Letter to Hunters, N.Y. TIMES (May 1,
1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/05/01/us/clinton-campaigns-for-weapons-ban-in-
letter-to-hunters.html (reporting President Clinton’s open letter to hunters regarding the
assault weapons ban and accompanying pledge “that he would ‘not allow the rights of
hunters and sportsmen to be infringed upon’”); Thomas B. Edsall, ‘Wedge’ Tack May Not
Find an Opening: Administration Has Defenses in Place, WASH. POST (Oct. 18, 1996), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1996/10/18/wedge-tack-may-not-find-an-
opening/5161b81c-a45c-47be-a1a0-f915167f1b69/ (noting Clinton’s argument, after pas-
sage of assault weapons ban, “that ‘two hunting seasons have come and gone’ since the two
bills were enacted, and no sportsman has lost a gun or the right to hunt” (quoting Presi-
dent Clinton)); see also McClurg, supra note 45, at 1024 (“I support the right to keep and R
bear arms.  I live in a state where over half the adults have hunting or fishing licenses or
both.” (quoting President Clinton, The 1992 Campaign; Transcript of 2nd TV Debate Between
Bush, Clinton and Perot, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/10/16/
us/the-1992-campaign-transcript-of-2d-tv-debate-between-bush-clinton-and-perot.html)).
48 McClurg, supra note 45, at 1031 (“I will not do anything to affect the rights of R
hunters or sportsmen.  I think that homeowners have to be respected in their right to have
a gun if they wish to.” (quoting Al Gore, 2000 Campaign; 2nd Presidential Debate Between Gov.
Bush and Vice President Gore, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/
10/12/us/2000-campaign-2nd-presidential-debate-between-gov-bush-vice-president-gore.
html)).
49 Id. at 1039 (quoting John Kerry, Transcript of Debate Between Bush and Kerry, with
Domestic Policy the Topic, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/14
/politics/campaign/transcript-of-debate-between-bush-and-kerry-with-domestic-policy-the-
topic.html); see also James Dao, Where Kerry Is Trying to Avoid Gore’s Pitfalls, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
13, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/13/politics/campaign/where-kerry-is-trying-
to-avoid-gores-pitfalls.html (noting that Kerry supporters in West Virginia have “tried to
defuse the gun issue by distributing leaflets featuring Mr. Kerry as a hunter who supports
the Second Amendment”).
50 Jack Kelly, NRA Campaigns Against Kerry, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 14, 2004,
at A8; see also James Dao, In N.R.A. Speech, Cheney’s Mark Is Kerry, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2004),
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/18/us/in-nra-speech-cheney-s-mark-is-kerry.html
(“Don’t be fooled, they are poseurs and fakes and they want your guns.  And the biggest
fraud of all?  John Kerry.” (quoting NRA lobbyist Chris Cox)).
51 Fred LeBrun, Schumer Pushing for Hunting Easements, ALBANY TIMES UNION (N.Y.),
Aug. 5, 2004, at C5, 2004 WLNR 635006.
52 SPITZER, supra note 7, at 99.
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These politicians are, of course, responding to what they see as political
imperatives, and no single body represents those imperatives more forcefully
than the NRA.  The NRA frequently touts its commitment to hunters: “In
truth, the NRA is without doubt the largest pro-hunting organization in the
world.  Eighty percent of our members hunt.”53  The NRA also does not hesi-
tate to invoke the Second Amendment, even when addressing such sensitive
topics as guns in schools.54  One might expect, therefore, to find the organi-
zation strongly espousing a Second Amendment right to hunt.  But despite
the NRA’s historical connection to hunting interests, it strenuously denies
that hunting is a Second Amendment right.  The nuance of this position is
important to understand.
The NRA was founded in New York in the early 1870s to promote rifle
practice in response the Union Army’s poor marksmanship in the Civil
War.55  For the first fifty years of its existence, the NRA’s primary focus was
on marksmanship and sporting activities.56  Within three years of the end of
World War II, however, “membership had tripled, although most of these
new members had a greater interest in hunting than in marksmanship.  The
NRA quickly adapted to this new priority.”57  Later, as Congress showed more
interest in regulating guns, the NRA
devoted increasing time and resources to its political agenda.  These shifting
organizational priorities are confirmed in a content analysis of the NRA pub-
lication the American Rifleman, in which the proportion of space given over
to target shooting declined from about 40 percent before World War II to
about 20 percent after the war.58
The big shift from hunting promotion to gun control prevention came
with the palace coup at the 1977 NRA convention,59 which is often described
as the turning point in the NRA’s overall identity.60  Many accounts suggest
53 Chris W. Cox, July 2012 Political Report: “On Capitol Hill and Beyond, The NRA Fights for
Hunters’ Rights”, NRA INST. FOR LEGIS. ACTION (June 26, 2012), http://www.nraila.org/
news-issues/articles/2012/july-2012-political-report-on-capitol-hill-and-beyond,-the-nra-
fights-for-hunters%E2%80%99-rights.aspx [hereinafter Cox, 2012 Political Report].
54 Timothy Johnson, What the Media Should Know About the NRA, Guns, and Schools,
MEDIA MATTERS FOR AM. (Apr. 12, 2013, 8:59 AM), http://mediamatters.org/blog/2013/
04/02/what-the-media-should-know-about-the-nra-guns-a/193402.
55 See OSHA GRAY DAVIDSON, UNDER FIRE: THE NRA AND THE BATTLE FOR GUN CONTROL
22–28 (expanded ed., Univ. Iowa Press 1998) (1993).
56 SPITZER, supra note 7, at 80–81.
57 Id. at 81.
58 Id.
59 Carl T. Bogus, Gun Control and America’s Cities: Public Policy and Politics, 1 ALB. GOV’T
L. REV. 440, 464 (2008) (“In 1977, there was a revolution within the National Rifle Associa-
tion (NRA), often referred to as the Cincinnati Revolt, in which political hardliners seized
power.  This watershed event turned a principally sporting and shooting association into a
principally political advocacy group and lobby.” (footnote omitted)); Kristin A. Goss, Pol-
icy, Politics, and Paradox: The Institutional Origins of the Great American Gun War, 73 FORDHAM
L. REV. 681, 711 (2004).
60 SPITZER, supra note 7, at 96–97 (arguing that prior to 1977, “the NRA leadership
had maintained the organization’s primary focus on sporting, hunting, and other recrea-
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that the number, influence, and power of hunters within the organization
have been shrinking since then.  Robert Spitzer, a political scientist who
wrote the leading book on the politics of gun control,61 reports: “I have
talked to many sportspeople who are not politically charged, and they say, ‘I
am not a member of the NRA . . . It is too political; it is too right wing; it is
too rabid.  And also it doesn’t focus enough on the hunting and sporting
stuff anymore.’”62
The NRA’s shifting budget priorities seem to reflect this view.63  Some
strident gun-rights advocates are happy to see the hunters go.64
The division between these hunters’ interests and the NRA’s increasing
focus on constitutional rhetoric is neatly captured by longtime NRA lobbyist
tional gun uses,” but that afterwards “the hard-liners have pushed the organization toward
total, unwavering opposition to all forms of gun regulation”).
61 See generally SPITZER, supra note 7.
62 Chuck Raasch & Kevin Johnson, NRA Is Mum Amid Calls for Change After Newtown
Shooting, USA TODAY (Dec. 18, 2012, 1:04 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
nation/2012/12/17/after-newtown-shooting-nra-is-mum/1776557/ (quoting Robert
Spitzer); see also Jeff Burns, Letter to the Editor, The N.R.A. and Hunters: It’s Complicated,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/28/opinion/the-nra-and-
hunters-its-complicated.html (“The rifle association has little to do with hunting or public
safety.  It has long since lost its way.”); Richard Ford, Armed but Not Alarmed, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 21, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/21/opinion/armed-but-not-
alarmed.html (“I find it hard to believe that my current hunting buddies and I have found
a natural mouthpiece for our interests in the person of Wayne LaPierre and the National
Rifle Association.”); A.B. Hayes, Jr., NRA Stands Fast—For Whom?, VIRGINIAN-PILOT &
LEDGER-STAR (Norfolk, VA), Aug. 26, 1994, at A18, 1994 WLNR 1883980 (“The NRA con-
tinues its radical no-compromise position on gun control; therefore, I have not renewed
my membership. . . . I have been a member of two hunt clubs for many years; never have I
seen an assault weapon or any need for one.”); John Krajewski, Letter to the Editor, Presi-
dent’s Action, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 22, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-01-22/
opinion/ct-vp-0122voicelettersbriefs-20130122_1_gun-control-gun-owners-gun-violence (“I
was a member of the National Rifle Association as an avid sports person and hunter.  I sent
back requests for continued membership when the NRA took a liking to the 50-caliber
rifles.  I told the organization that it no longer represented me since I will not hunt with a
sidearm, 50-caliber gun, or an assault weapon.”); Lily Raff McCaulou, I Hunt, but the N.R.A.
Isn’t for Me, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/25/opinion/i-
hunt-but-i-oppose-the-nra.html.
63 SPITZER, supra note 7, at 88 (“Fewer NRA resources have been devoted to traditional
hunting, shooting, and other programs.  In 1980, 19 percent of the NRA budget went to
hunter safety programs, police training courses, and the like.  By 1988, only 11 percent of
the budget was devoted to such programs.”).
64 DAN BAUM, GUN GUYS 82 (2013) (“The truth was, a lot of gun-rights activists didn’t
even consider hunters allies in the cause.  They called them ‘Fudds’ and dismissed them as
dilettantes who lolled comfortably in their privileged status as the only legitimate gun
users.”); see, e.g., Scott Gilmore Milton-Freewater, Letter to the Editor, Departure of NRA
Member Won’t Be Cause for Tears, EAST OREGONIAN (Pendleton, OR), Feb. 4, 2013, 2013
WLNR 2886527 (“The Elmer Fudd fantasy regarding hunting and the Second Amendment
was cooked up to divide hunters and recreational shooters on the purpose of the Second
Amendment. . . . The amendment has absolutely nothing to do with hunting, and never
has.”).
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Tanya Metaksa: “Isn’t it so that sport was the furthest thing from the minds of
the Founding Fathers?  They were building a country, not a country club.”65
To be sure, the organization counts eighty percent of its members as
hunters,66 assures them that it will defend their “right to hunt, shoot and
own a gun for self-defense,”67 and until recently maintained a website called
NRAHuntersRights.org.68  The organization also notes:
NRA’s commitment to hunting is enshrined in our bylaws, which state, in
part, that one of the organization’s core objectives is “to promote hunter
safety, and to promote and defend hunting as a shooting sport and as a
viable and necessary method of fostering the propagation, growth and con-
servation, and wise use of our renewable wildlife resources.”69
It is worth noting, however, that this commitment to hunting is listed
fifth out of five purposes and objectives in the bylaws.70  The first is to
“[p]rotect and defend the Constitution of the United States.”71  The last is
“[t]o foster and promote the shooting sports.”72
65 Tanya K. Metaksa, Self-Defense: A Primary Civil Right, in GUNS IN AMERICA, supra note
7, at 194–95 (“Could it be that the Founding Fathers, after protecting religious freedom,
then set about to protect hunting?  Could it be that the Founding Fathers, after safeguard-
ing free speech and free assembly, then hastened to safeguard target shooting?”).
66 Cox, 2012 Political Report, supra note 53, at 2.
67 Herz, supra note 45, at 104 n.211 (quoting Letter from Tanya Metaksa, Exec. Dir.,
Institute for Legislative Action, to NRA Members (May 20, 1994) (on file with Boston Uni-
versity Law Review)); Editorial, National Rifle (Selling) Association, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/21/opinion/national-rifle-selling-association.html
(“Officials from the N.R.A. have repeatedly said that their main goal is to protect the Sec-
ond Amendment rights of rank-and-file members who like to hunt or want guns for
protection.”).
68 New Brochure—“NRA: Fighting for Hunters’ Rights”, NRAHUNTERSRIGHTS.ORG (June 6,
2012), https://web.archive.org/web/20130125194409/http://www.nrahuntersrights.org/
Article.aspx?id=6644.  The website was taken down sometime in 2013 while this Article was
being written, but can be accessed by searching for NRAHuntersRights.org in the Internet
Archive index.  The brochure was apparently replaced with another, What NRA Does for
Hunters, which makes many of the same points and also does not invoke the Second
Amendment even once. See What NRA Does for Hunters, NRA-ILA.ORG, http://www.nraila.
org/media/PDFs/NRA_hunting.pdf.
69 New Brochure—“NRA: Fighting for Hunters’ Rights”, supra note 68.
70 Bruce H. Kobayashi & Joseph E. Olson, In Re 101 California Street: A Legal and
Economic Analysis of Strict Liability for the Manufacture and Sale of “Assault Weapons”, 8 STAN. L.
& POL’Y REV. 41, 41 n.5 (1997) (quoting NRA Bylaws, Art. II(1) (1996)).  The NRA’s bylaws
are not publicly available, and despite repeated requests I have been unable to obtain a
copy.  Kobayashi and Olson quote from the Bylaws in their 1997 article, however, and
Olson is a member of the NRA’s board of directors, so I believe that the text they use must
have been accurate at least as of that date.  Moreover, a current NRA publication repro-
duces the fifth article—numbered as such—on its first page. See also What NRA Does for
Hunters, supra note 68, at 1.
71 Kobayashi & Olson, supra note 70, at 41 n.5 (quoting NRA Bylaws, Art. II(1)
(1996)).
72 NRA Bylaws, Art. II(1) (1996).
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The space between the first and last of these purposes seems significant,
as evidenced by the fact that the NRA advocates hunters rights without rely-
ing on the federal Constitution.  NRAHuntersRights.org did not even men-
tion the Second Amendment.  There is one way, however, in which the NRA
does explicitly invoke the “right to hunt.”  Exemplary in this regard is a bro-
chure the organization produced called NRA: Fighting for Hunters’ Rights.73
Though invoking “rights,” it says nothing at all about the Second Amend-
ment, instead emphasizing state constitutional law—and properly so, because
some state constitutions now have provisions guaranteeing the right to hunt
with arms.74  As Akhil Amar notes, “[t]hese state constitutional references to
hunting and recreation appear to be of a distinctly recent vintage, enacted in
the 1980s and 1990s.”75  In fact, they were largely a product of NRA advo-
cacy.76  And it stands to reason that they were added precisely because the
Second Amendment alone was not seen as sufficient to protect the right to
hunt.
B. “The Second Amendment Ain’t About Hunting”
That the NRA does not endorse the pro-hunting view of the Second
Amendment is perhaps unexpected.  It is less surprising that the anti-hunting
view is often voiced by gun regulation advocates and those favoring a militia-
based reading of the Amendment.  The reason for this is straightforward: if
the Amendment covers only armed service in a militia, then by definition it
does not include a right to hunt, either on its own terms77 or alongside other
73 New Brochure—“NRA: Fighting for Hunters’ Rights”, supra note 68.
74 See Halbrook, supra note 5, at 229–33 (listing thirteen state provisions that protect a
right to hunt, seven of which specifically protect a right to hunt with arms).
75 Akhil Reed Amar, The Second Amendment: A Case Study in Constitutional Interpretation,
2001 UTAH L. REV. 889, 902 n.37.
76 See NRA’s Right to Hunt and Fish Amendments Adopted in Three States, NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N
POL. VICTORY FUND (Nov. 5 2010), http://www.nrapvf.org/news-alerts/2010/11/nra%E2%
80%99s-right-to-hunt-and-fish-amendments-adopted-in-three-states.aspx (quoting Chris
Cox, NRA-ILA executive director, as saying that the “NRA will continue to lead efforts to
pass these [right-to-hunt] amendments across the nation”).
77 See, e.g., Rachana Bhowmik, Aiming for Accountability: How City Lawsuits Can Help
Reform an Irresponsible Gun Industry, 11 J.L. & POL’Y 67, 87 (2002) (“[T]he Second Amend-
ment was not meant to protect the rights of hunters or sportsmen, but was purely a means
of protecting a state’s right to maintain an organized armed force.”); Garry Wills, Gun
Question Broadens, CHI. SUN-TIMES, April 5, 1997, at 16, 1997 WLNR 7143819 (“The Second
Amendment authorizes the government’s militia; it has nothing to do with hunting.”).
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personal uses of arms.78  Some commentators simply emphasize the fact that
the right to hunt is not enumerated in the Amendment’s text.79
On this particular issue of the Amendment’s scope, gun regulation advo-
cates find themselves in an unlikely alliance with gun-rights supporters.  One
of the central oddities of gun-rights rhetoric is that many of the Second
Amendment’s most vociferous supporters also regularly insist—often indig-
nantly—that some of the most widespread uses of guns in the United States
are not protected by the Amendment.  This sentiment is captured by the title
of an oft-cited law review article by former NRA Assistant General Counsel
Thomas Moncure: The Second Amendment Ain’t About Hunting.80  This epigram
(sometimes appearing in a more specific “duck hunting” variety81) is perhaps
not as well-known as other famous lines like “Guns don’t kill people; people
78 Stuart Banner, The Second Amendment, So Far, 117 HARV. L. REV. 898, 903 (2004)
(book review) (“The preamble reminds us of something that is obvious from the eight-
eenth-century sources and contested today only by extremists, which is that the Second
Amendment was not about hunting, or target shooting, or scaring off burglars.  It was
intended to preserve the militia.”); Robert J. Spitzer, The Second Amendment “Right to Bear
Arms” and United States v. Emerson, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 6 (2003) (“The Second
Amendment provides no protection for personal weapons uses, including hunting, sport-
ing, collecting, or even personal self-protection . . . .”); David Yassky, The Second Amendment:
Structure, History, and Constitutional Change, 99 MICH. L. REV. 588, 597 (2000) (“I hope to
discredit a libertarian version of the revisionist approach, which sees activities like hunting
and recreational shooting as interests protected by the Second Amendment.  This position,
while it may be widespread among lay Second Amendment enthusiasts, cannot be sup-
ported by the historical record.”).
79 See, e.g., Donald W. Dowd, The Relevance of the Second Amendment to Gun Control Legis-
lation, 58 MONT. L. REV. 79, 105 (1997) (“[T]here is little reason to believe that the failure
to mention hunting within the language of the Second Amendment was an oversight or a
belief that it was already covered elsewhere.”).  The same argument is sometimes embraced
by those seeking to defend the Amendment’s honor. See, e.g., Brandon Harvey, Opinion,
Your Turn NH: Some Anti-Gun Arguments Are So Lame that One Has to Respond, N.H. UNION
LEADER (Feb. 10, 2013, 4:25 PM), http://www.unionleader.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID
=/20130211/OPINION02/130219921/1016/news07&template=printart (“[T]he Second
Amendment . . . does not say ‘the right to hunt deer.’  In fact, deer hunting is not a
right.”); E.L. Ward, Letter to the Editor, NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, Apr. 16, 1989, at
C16 (“If I am not mistaken, the Second Amendment says nothing about hunting or recrea-
tional use.  The Second Amendment was for the protection of oneself, family and
nation.”).
80 Thomas M. Moncure, Jr., The Second Amendment Ain’t About Hunting, 34 HOW. L.J.
589 (1991).
81 David B. Kopel, It Isn’t About Duck Hunting: The British Origins of the Right to Arms, 93
MICH. L. REV. 1333, 1333 (1995); L.A. Powe, Jr., Guns, Words, and Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1311, 1316 (1997) (“[B]y its very terms, the Amendment is
addressed to the militia and military.  Therefore, it is not about duck hunting either . . . .”
(footnote omitted)); Siegel, supra note 16, at 227–28 (quoting Neal Knox assuring the
NRA membership that the Republication leadership had promised to adopt a “coherent
Second Amendment strategy to define gun ownership as a constitutional right, not a duck-
hunting right”); S. Vaughn Binzer, Opinion, Against Handgun Ban, ADVERTISING AGE, Mar.
30, 1992, at 28 (“‘The Second Amendment is not about duck hunting.’”).
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kill people.”82  But it has nonetheless become deeply embedded in gun-
rights rhetoric.  A recent article in the National Review exemplifies the
argument:
The Second Amendment is not about Bambi and burglars—whatever a well-
regulated militia is, it is not a hunting party or a sport-clays club.  It is
remarkable to me that any educated person . . . believes that the second item
on the Bill of Rights is a constitutional guarantee of enjoying a recreational
activity.83
The anti-hunting argument is important enough that many politicians
seeking to curry favor with pro-gun voters are careful to make it;84 others are
criticized when they fail to do so.85
At least as a matter of political rhetoric, these anti-hunting arguments
are presumably directed at a constituency that supports guns but does not
believe the Second Amendment protects their use for hunting and recrea-
tion.  The size of this constituency is difficult to establish, but its existence is
apparent to anyone who makes even a cursory review of letters to the editor,
political speeches, blog posts, and online comments.  Defenders of the Sec-
ond Amendment and opponents of gun regulation proclaim the anti-hunt-
ing argument on bumper stickers86 and t-shirts.87  They write letters to the
82 See Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Five Myths About Gun Control, WASH. POST (June 13,
2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/11/AR201006
1103259.html (arguing that the “[g]uns don’t kill people, people kill people” slogan “has
infected the public imagination with the mistaken belief that it’s just criminals, not weap-
ons, that lead to deadly violence”); John J. Lennon, A Perspective on Guns, Murder, Suicide
from Attica, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2013), http://kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/12/14/a-
perspective-on-guns-murder-suicide-from-attica/ (“The mantra ‘guns don’t kill people,
people kill people’ reverberates throughout our society.”).
83 Kevin D. Williamson, Regulating the Militia, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Dec. 28, 2012, 4:00
AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/336529/regulating-militia-kevin-d-william
son.
84 See, e.g., Chuck Raasch, Gun-Friendly States Woo Firearms Manufacturers; Leaders Promise
to Keep Government Hands off Business, USA TODAY (Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.usatoday.
com/story/news/nation/2013/02/24/gun-manufacturers-second-amendment-states/
1942633/ (“This isn’t about deer hunting . . . . The Second Amendment is about our right
to keep and bear arms to defend ourselves.” (quoting Rep. Jeff Duncan (R-S.C.))); Jennifer
Steinhauer, Senator Unveils Bill to Limit Semiautomatic Arms, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/25/us/politics/senator-unveils-bill-to-limit-semiauto
matic-arms.html (“The Second Amendment wasn’t written so you can go hunting, it was to
create a force to balance a tyrannical force here.” (quoting Sen. Tom Coburn (R-O.K.))).
85 Richard Burrow, Letter to the Editor, CHARLESTON GAZETTE (WV), Apr. 2, 2013, at
4A (“[Sen. Joe Manchin] stated that he believes 75 percent of West Virginians, like him,
think the only purposes behind gun ownership and the Second Amendment are hunting
and recreational shooting. . . . In other words, he does not believe what the Second
Amendment truly means.”).
86 Allen Rostron, Protecting Gun Rights and Improving Gun Control after District of
Columbia v. Heller, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 383, 392 (2009).
87 David C. Williams, The Militia Movement and Second Amendment Revolution: Conjuring
with the People, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 879, 886 (1996) [hereinafter Williams, Militia Movement]
(“The Militia of Montana (MOM) markets a T-shirt bearing an image of an eighteenth-
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editor arguing that “[t]he Second Amendment is not about hunters, gun col-
lectors or recreational target shooters.  The Second Amendment to the Con-
stitution is about the security of a free state.”88  And the social and political
movement they represent has been enormously successful in shaping both
political debate and constitutional doctrine.
What, then, are they arguing for?  As suggested by the tone and sub-
stance of the passages quoted above, the anti-hunting argument is often
accompanied by arguments that the Second Amendment is really about the
prevention of tyranny.89  Allen Rostron notes:
Gun rights advocates have heavily emphasized that point for years, arguing
that the primary purpose of the Amendment was to enable Americans to
deter and to resist tyranny.  The idea has even been captured in a slogan
emblazoned on bumper stickers: “The Second Amendment is not about
duck hunting.”  Although the meaning of that saying may be opaque to
many, it is well understood by gun rights proponents . . . .90
The prevention-of-tyranny view itself comes in many variations.91  Some
of the most strident (albeit unrepresentative) supporters of the anti-tryanny
view have been those associated with the modern militia movement, and they
century militia member and the legend: ‘The Second Amendment isn’t about hunting or
target shooting . . . It’s about FREEDOM!’” (alteration in original)).
88 John Lester, Paranoia over Packing, ROANOAKE TIMES, May 8, 2012, at A15, 2012
WLNR 9694304; see also Faust P. Barron, Second Amendment: Ultimate Check and Balance, NEW
ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, July 14, 1992, at B6, 1992 WLNR 814699 (“The Second Amend-
ment wasn’t written to protect sport hunting or recreational shooting.  It was written to
protect freedom.”); John Kunkel, Letter to the Editor, Second Amendment is About Weapons to
Fight Revolution, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 22, 2013 (“The Second Amendment is not about
self-protection or recreational shooting.  It’s about revolution—citizens need to be armed
with weapons that closely equal those of their would-be oppressors.”); Michael A. Thiac,
Viewpoints, Amendment Not for Recreation, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 8, 1999, at A23, 1999
WLNR 7657161 (“Remember why the Founders put the Second Amendment into the Con-
stitution?  Not for hunting or for recreation, but in case the power of government over
time became abusive.”).
89 See, e.g., Gregory A. Inskip, Our Right to Bear Arms, 8 DEL. LAW. 21, 22 (1991) (“The
reason that we have a constitutional right to bear arms is not so that we can go deer hunt-
ing or skeet shooting.  It is so that the general militia—the armed citizenry—will be ready
at need to repel foreign invasion, to rise against domestic tyranny, and to suppress insur-
rection or crime.”); Kevin Kirk, Letter to the Editor, Guns Against Tyranny, KANSAS CITY
STAR (MO), Mar. 1, 2013 (“The Second Amendment does not exist to preserve recrea-
tional use of firearms . . . . Nor is its purpose to allow use of guns for self/home
defense . . . . Its true purpose is to allow people to defend themselves against a totalitarian
government.”); Aeon J. Skoble, Letter to the Editor, Voices of Hunters, and the N.R.A., N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 27, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/27/opinion/l-voices-of-hunters-
and-the-nra-478539.html (“The Second Amendment was not included to protect sport
hunters like Mr. Ford and his chums.  Rather, the Second Amendment was specifically
intended as a hedge against tyrannical government.”).
90 Rostron, supra note 86, at 391–92 (footnotes omitted).
91 For particularly thoughtful studies of the anti-tyranny view, see Darrell A.H. Miller,
Retail Rebellion and the Second Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 939 (2011); Williams, Death to Tyrants,
supra note 25.
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sharply distinguish their view from the notion of a Second Amendment right
to hunt.92  Somewhat less frequently, the pro-hunting position is contrasted
with the self-defense view of the Second Amendment.93  This is significant,
since Heller recognized self-defense as the “core” and “central component” of
the Second Amendment.94
Naturally, people who endorse the anti-hunting argument as a constitu-
tional matter need not oppose hunting.  It is perfectly coherent to believe, as
many do, that hunting should be celebrated and legally protected, even
though the Second Amendment has nothing to do with it.  As one group put
it, “Use of firearms for self-defence against criminals, or for hunting, is time-
honored, lawful, and praiseworthy.”95  But “[t]he point of the Second
Amendment . . . is not hunting or self-defense; otherwise, the framers would
have said so ‘in plain English.’”96  Others say that the framers considered
duck hunting to be “morally laudable.”97  Indeed, some scholars perceive a
kind of reluctance behind the anti-hunting view—a concession, rather than
92 Calvin Massey, Guns, Extremists, and the Constitution, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1095,
1097 & n.9 (2000).  Professor Massey notes that Linda Thompson is the self-proclaimed
“Adjutant General of the Unorganized Militia of the United States.” Id.; see also David C.
Williams, Constitutional Tales of Violence: Populists, Outgroups, and the Multicultural Landscape
of the Second Amendment, 74 TUL. L. REV. 387, 424 (1999) [hereinafter Williams, Constitu-
tional Tales] (“[T]he militia movement distrusts the media and the government, believes
that a conspiracy is afoot to deprive Americans of their constitutional liberties, and argues
that the prime purpose of the Second Amendment was to prevent tyranny, not to guaran-
tee hunting or self-defense rights.”).
93 See, e.g., Derek Smith, The Challenges and Nuances of Defending Firearms Offense Charges
in Washington State, in STRATEGIES FOR DEFENDING FIREARM OFFENSE CHARGES 129, 149
(2013) (“On the anti-gun side, I think there needs to be understanding that the Second
Amendment is about self-defense, not hunting.”); see also Dowd, supra note 79, at 104
(“[W]hile there is legitimate argument that self-defense is an inalienable right, and the
right to keep arms was given to support this right, there is no similar argument for hunt-
ing, shooting, gun collecting or other recreational uses of guns.”).  Nelson Lund seems to
draw the distinction as well, though in a more oblique way. See Nelson Lund, The Past and
Future of the Individual’s Right to Arms, 31 GA. L. REV. 1, 59–60 n.139 (1996) (“It is an even
greater mistake, and a morally questionable one at that, to suggest that there are no consti-
tutionally significant differences between self-defense and recreation, or between either of
them and criminal behavior.”).
94 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599, 630 (2008); see also McDonald v.
City of Chicago, 560 U.S. 742, 767–68 (2010).
95 Williams, Constitutional Tales, supra note 92, at 422 (quoting JAY SIMKIN ET AL., JEWS
FOR THE PRESERVATION OF FIREARMS OWNERSHIP, LETHAL LAWS: GUN CONTROL IS THE KEY TO
GENOCIDE 3 (1994)).
96 Id.
97 David B. Kopel, On the Firing Line: Clinton’s Crime Bill, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION
LECTURES (Sept. 24, 1993), http://www.heritage.org/Research/Crime/HL476.cfm (“The
Second Amendment isn’t about duck hunting, nor about shooting lone criminals,
although both activities were considered morally laudable.  The Second Amendment at its
core is about fear of a criminal federal government in general, and fear of a federal stand-
ing army in particular.”).
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an affirmative claim, that hunting does not fall within the scope of the
Amendment.98
All of this makes sense, since one motivation behind the anti-hunting
argument is apparently to ennoble the Second Amendment by separating it
from such seemingly trivial things as hunting and recreation.99  Moncure’s
article clearly had this target in mind: “To suggest that the second amend-
ment is entitled to less dignity than other amendments is to disparage the
entire Bill of Rights.  The second amendment is not about hunting but it is,
in its final analysis, about liberty.”100  Much of the indignation in the anti-
hunting argument might be a reaction against the perceived denigration of
the right to keep and bear arms.  This helps explain why some scholars and
commentators dismiss the issue as a distraction:
The “recreational and sporting uses” often cited by both sides in the contem-
porary gun control debate, on the other hand, are not relevant.  They are
cited by those who favor gun control in the hopes of not arousing the fears
of hunters and target shooters, and by those who oppose gun control in the
hopes of mobilizing those same groups.  But they have nothing to do
(directly) with the purpose of maintaining an armed citizenry.101
Perhaps, then, the anti-hunting argument should be better understood
as an argument that the Amendment is about something more than hunting,
98 Daniel Abrams, Note, Ending the Other Arms Race: An Argument for a Ban on Assault
Weapons, 10 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 488, 503 (1992) (“Even staunch gun advocates concede
that the Second Amendment had nothing to do with hunting, target shooting, or any
other non-militia purpose.”).
99 Metaksa, supra note 65, at 194 (“Could it be that the Founding Fathers, after pro-
tecting religious freedom, then set about to protect hunting?  Could it be that the Found-
ing Fathers, after safeguarding free speech and free assembly, then hastened to safeguard
target shooting?”); Paul Danish, Letter to the Editor, USA TODAY, Aug. 8, 1989, at 7A
(“The point is that the Second Amendment isn’t about duck hunting any more than the
First Amendment is about recreational reading.”).  Interestingly, some have apparently
concluded that there is a “right” to hunt precisely because it is so trivial.  While criticizing
the “individual rights” view of the Second Amendment, Chief Justice Warren Burger (him-
self a lifelong hunter) wrote: “Nor does anyone seriously question that the Constitution
protects the right of hunters to own and keep sporting guns for hunting game any more
than anyone would challenge the right to own and keep fishing rods and other equipment
for fishing—or to own automobiles.”  Warren E. Burger, The Right to Bear Arms, PARADE,
Jan. 14, 1990, at 4–6.  David Kopel calls this a “real shocker,” noting (prior to Heller) that
“the Supreme Court [had] never recognized” a right to bear arms for hunting, “and its
lone decision on the subject is to the contrary.”  David B. Kopel, The Supreme Court’s Thirty-
Five Other Gun Cases: What the Supreme Court Has Said About the Second Amendment, 18 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 99, 129 n.88 (1999).
100 Moncure, supra note 80, at 597.  The NRA still employs this line.  Chris W. Cox,
Letter to the Editor, The View from the N.R.A.: ‘We’ll Fight for You’, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/04/opinion/the-view-from-the-nra-well-fight-for-
you.html?_r=0 (“Whether liberal or conservative, Republican or Democrat, man or woman,
we’ll fight for you because at its core, the Second Amendment isn’t about hunting.  It’s
about self-defense and freedom.”).
101 Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV.
461, 480 (1995) [hereinafter Reynolds, Critical Guide].
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but that the greater includes the lesser.  Maybe the Second Amendment was
added to the Constitution to prevent tyranny or enable self-defense, but has
the effect of protecting other gun-related activities such as hunting.  This is
plausible—it is, in fact, the best argument in favor of Second Amendment
coverage of hunting, and is addressed more detail below.102  But it is not the
common form of the anti-hunting argument, which emphasizes that hunting
is no part of the Second Amendment.103  As the NRA’s Chris Cox puts it, “the
Second Amendment has really nothing to do with hunting.”104
The discussion up until this point has focused more on constitutional
rhetoric than on constitutional doctrine.  But the two are deeply intertwined,
which is precisely why it is important to consider one in order to make sense
of the other.  One person who seems to understand this point quite clearly is
Justice Scalia.  As he has noted: “There is a perhaps inevitable but nonethe-
less distressing tendency to equate the existence of a right with the nonexis-
tence of a responsibility”—that a legal right to engage in an activity suggests
that it is “proper and perhaps even good” to do so.105  The Justice is also an
“enthusiastic hunter,”106 and during the course of a speech to a hunting
organization, he called for efforts to change “[t]he attitude of people associ-
ating guns with nothing but crime.”107  Two years after that speech, he
authored the majority opinion in Heller.  Perhaps that opinion, and the gen-
102 See infra Section II.B.
103 See, e.g., John W. Bissell, Bench Opinion on the Second Amendment, 10 SETON HALL
CONST. L.J. 807, 808 (2000) (“[T]he Second Amendment quite clearly has absolutely noth-
ing to do with hunting or target shooting.”); John W. Lesniak, Letter to the Editor, Gun
Control Advocates Are Again Showing How Illogical They Are, ALBANY TIMES UNION (NY), Nov.
20, 1993, at A6 (“The Second Amendment has nothing to do with hunting or recreation.”);
John D. Priest, Letter to the Editor, HUNTSVILLE TIMES (AL), Jan. 23, 2013, at 012A (“Argu-
ments from the ‘gun control advocates’ are often intentionally dishonest.  Here’s a classic:
‘You don’t need an assault weapon to hunt.’  Of course not, but the second amendment
has NOTHING to do with hunting.”).
104 Talk of the Nation: Analysis: Politics of Guns and the Gun Industry (National Public
Radio broadcast May 15, 2003).
105 Antonin Scalia, Law, Liberty and Civic Responsibility, in RIGHTS, CITIZENSHIP AND
RESPONSIBILITIES 3 (1984); cf. MARY ANN GLENDON, INTRODUCTION: FORGOTTEN QUESTIONS,
in SEEDBEDS OF VIRTUE 1, 21 (Mary Ann Glendon & David Blakenhorn eds. 1995); Mary
Ann Glendon, Looking for “Persons” in the Law, FIRST THINGS, Dec. 2006, http://
www.firstthings.com/article/2006/12/looking-forpersonsin-the-law (“[C]itizens . . . tend
to regard the Supreme Court’s pronouncements not merely as legal rulings but also as
moral teachings grounded in the country’s most sacred civil document.”).
106 Rostron, supra note 86, at 388 n.15 (alteration in original) (quoting Clay Carey,
Scalia Champions Hunting and Conservation, TENNESSEAN, Feb. 26, 2006, at 1B).  The year
before he authored the majority opinion in Heller, Scalia received the “Sport Shooting
Ambassador Award” from the World Forum on the Future of Sport Shooting Activities, “an
international association of gun makers and gun rights organizations such as the NRA.”  Id.
(citing Josh Sugarmann, “Sport Shooting Ambassador Award” Winner Antonin Scalia’s 2nd
Amendment Ruling Does His Gun Pals Proud, THE HUFFINGTON POST (June 26, 2008, 10:54
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/josh-sugarmann/sport-shooting ambassador_b_10
9367.html).
107 Rostron, supra note 86, at 388 n.15 (citing Carey, supra note 106).
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eral effort to describe hunting as a right, will help ennoble gun possession
and use, including hunting.  But, as the next Part shows, it is hard to justify a
Second Amendment right to hunt as a matter of constitutional doctrine.
II. TWO THEORIES OF HUNTING AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT
In addition to their political significance, the pro-hunting and anti-hunt-
ing arguments also represent claims about the Second Amendment.108  This
Part considers two possible ways in which hunting could be constitutionally
salient as a doctrinal matter: either because it is directly covered by the Sec-
ond Amendment or because it is peripherally covered.
The analysis shows that those who say the Amendment “ain’t about hunt-
ing” generally have the better of the argument.  Hunting and other recrea-
tional uses of guns have no explicit or otherwise direct protection in the text
of the Constitution or under existing doctrine, nor does the historical evi-
dence support such a conclusion.  It is, however, plausible that hunting
might be peripherally protected on the grounds that it falls within the
Amendment’s penumbras or is instrumentally useful to core Second Amend-
ment’s interests like self-defense.  Such instrumental or penumbral protec-
tion would be relatively weak.
A. Hunting is Directly Protected
1. Heller v. District of Columbia
Doctrinally, if not chronologically, the argument for direct Second
Amendment coverage of hunting begins with Heller itself.  Some judges,109
politicians,110 and scholars111 (even those otherwise skeptical of the Court’s
holding112) read the opinion as constitutionalizing a right to armed hunting
and recreation.  And some post-Heller cases have effectively reached that con-
clusion as a matter of law.  In Ezell v. City of Chicago, for example, the Seventh
Circuit considered a Chicago ordinance banning firing ranges within city lim-
108 SPITZER, supra note 7, at 18 (arguing that the “meaning and consequences of the
Second Amendment” must be assessed before one can “judge the abundant ‘rights talk’
surrounding the gun control debate”).
109 United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 468 (4th Cir. 2011) (Niemeyer, J., con-
curring) (citing Heller for the proposition that “the right to keep and bear arms was found
to have been understood to exist not only for self-defense, but also for membership in a
militia and for hunting, neither of which is a home-bound activity” (citation omitted)).
110 Press Release, Senator Jeff Sessions, Sessions Comments on Supreme Court’s Sec-
ond Amendment Opinion (June 26, 2008) (“[T]he Court issued a strong holding that the
Second Amendment protects the right of Americans to possess firearms for lawful pur-
poses like recreation, hunting, and self-defense.”).
111 See, e.g., David B. Kopel, How the British Gun Control Program Precipitated the American
Revolution, 6 CHARLESTON L. REV. 283, 327 (2012) (concluding that Heller and McDonald
both “hold that . . . sporting uses such as hunting are part of the Second Amendment”).
112 Carl T. Bogus, Heller and Insurrectionism, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 253, 260 (2008) (“By
the end of its opinion, [the Court] opted for the kitchen sink approach and threw in
hunting and threats of foreign invasions for good measure.”).
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its, and found that range training is not categorically unprotected by the Sec-
ond Amendment.113  It is important, therefore, to evaluate both what Heller
says about hunting and whether what it says makes sense.
To the extent that claims about Heller refer to the text of the opinion,
they typically point to the majority’s claim that “most [Americans] undoubt-
edly thought [the right] even more important for self-defense and hunting”
than for militia service.114  Elsewhere, the Heller majority referred to hunting
in support of the individual rights view:
Justice Stevens thinks it significant that the Virginia, New York, and North
Carolina Second Amendment proposals were “embedded . . . within a group
of principles that are distinctly military in meaning,” such as statements
about the danger of standing armies.  But so was the highly influential
minority proposal in Pennsylvania, yet that proposal, with its reference to
hunting, plainly referred to an individual right.115
The dissenting Justices, unsurprisingly, argued to the contrary that the
framers did not intend, nor were they understood, to create an individual
right to private uses of weapons, including hunting.116  Here is the entirety of
Justice Breyer’s argument about hunting and shooting sports:
The majority briefly suggests that the “right to keep and bear Arms” might
encompass an interest in hunting.  But in enacting the present provisions,
the District sought to “take nothing away from sportsmen.”  And any inability
of District residents to hunt near where they live has much to do with the
jurisdiction’s exclusively urban character and little to do with the District’s
firearm laws.  For reasons similar to those I discussed in the preceding sub-
section—that the District’s law does not prohibit possession of rifles or shot-
guns, and the presence of opportunities for sporting activities in nearby
States—I reach a similar conclusion, namely, that the District’s law burdens
any sports-related or hunting-related objectives that the Amendment may
protect little, or not at all.117
Justice Stevens similarly noted that “the Second Amendment’s omission
of any statement of purpose related to the right to use firearms for hunting
or personal self-defense[] is especially striking.”118  Disputing the majority’s
reliance on a citation to Joseph Story, Stevens argued that “[t]here is not so
much as a whisper in the passage above that Story believed that the right
113 651 F.3d 684, 704 (7th Cir. 2011).
114 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008).
115 Id. at 604 (citation omitted).
116 These arguments should not be dismissed simply because they appear in dissents.
The fact that Stevens and Breyer dissented with regard to the holding about self-defense
does not mean that they were necessarily also in dissent with regard to hunting—an issue
the Court did not reach, see infra note 121—and indeed they have been cited to support
the pro-hunting view.  Michael P. O’Shea, The Right to Defensive Arms After District of Colum-
bia v. Heller, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 349, 350–51 (2009) [hereinafter O’Shea, Defensive Arms]
(citing the Breyer and Stevens dissents for the proposition that “participating in shooting
sports” is a “legitimate purpose[ ] for arms”).
117 Heller, 554 U.S. at 709–10 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
118 Id. at 642 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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secured by the Amendment bore any relation to private use or possession of
weapons for activities like hunting or personal self-defense.”119
This represents the sum total of Heller’s direct references to hunting,
and it is difficult to construct from them a right to armed hunting or recrea-
tion.120  A more modest and faithful reading of Heller is that it neither estab-
lishes nor forecloses constitutional coverage for hunting.  That should not be
surprising, since the Second Amendment status of hunting was not before
the Court—Dick Heller did not argue for it,121 and the challenged regula-
tion specifically exempted “lawful recreational purposes” from its safe storage
requirement.122
The Court did, however, suggest that “future evaluation” might bring
further interests under the Second Amendment’s umbrella.123  The Third
Circuit subsequently noted that Heller discussed “hunting’s importance to the
pre-ratification conception of the right,” and concluded that, in addition to
“protect[ing] the right of law-abiding citizens to possess non-dangerous
weapons for self-defense in the home,” the Amendment “must protect the
right of law-abiding citizens to possess firearms for other, as-yet-undefined,
lawful purposes.”124  Scholars, too, have recognized the possibility that hunt-
ing might one day fall within the ambit of the Second Amendment.125
119 Id. at 668.
120 The court of appeals decision came closer to identifying a Second Amendment
right to hunt.  Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 395 (D.C. Cir. 2007), aff’d sub
nom. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (concluding that the Second Amendment protects an individual
right to keep and bear arms that “existed prior to the formation of the new government
under the Constitution and was premised on the private use of arms for activities such as
hunting and self-defense”).
121 Dennis A. Henigan, The Woollard Decision and the Lessons of the Trayvon Martin Trag-
edy, 71 MD. L. REV. 1188, 1196 (2012) (“[T]he only issue posed and resolved in Heller was
the right to have a handgun in the home for self-defense.  Mr. Heller never asserted that
the District’s handgun ban limited his hunting activities.”); see also Michael Steven Green,
Why Protect Private Arms Possession? Nine Theories of the Second Amendment, 84 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 131, 184 (2008) (noting that a hunting-based view of the Second Amendment “would
be much narrower than most Second Amendment advocates demand and would be insuffi-
cient to strike down the laws at issue in Heller”); O’Shea, Defensive Arms, supra note 116, at
369 (“The Heller Court has little occasion to discuss other legitimate personal purposes for
firearms, such as hunting and target shooting, since the District of Columbia prohibitions
challenged in the case so directly implicate the core purpose of self-defense.”).
122 Heller, 554 U.S. at 630 (majority opinion) (stating that the safe storage requirement
does not apply to arms “being used for lawful recreational purposes within the District of
Columbia” (citing D.C. CODE § 7-2507.02 (2001)).
123 Id. at 635 (“[W]hatever else [the Second Amendment] leaves to future evaluation, it
surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use
arms in defense of hearth and home.”).
124 United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 92 (3d Cir. 2010) (footnote omitted).
125 Williams, Death to Tyrants, supra note 25, at 641 (“[I]n the future, the Court may
find other uses [besides self-defense] protected by the Second Amendment—hunting and
target shooting come to mind—and so the Constitution will presumably then limit what
game wardens and zoning boards can and cannot do.”).
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Heller itself suggests that Second Amendment doctrine is to be con-
structed based on the Amendment’s original public meaning,126 and the
majority confidently declared that “most [Americans] undoubtedly thought
[the right] even more important for self-defense and hunting.”127  And yet
there is little evidence that the framers, ratifiers, or general public at the time
intended or believed hunting to be covered by the Second Amendment.
Unsurprisingly, scholars skeptical of the “individual right” reading of the
Amendment emphasize that the debates surrounding the Second Amend-
ment say nothing at all about hunting.128  Perhaps more notably, even schol-
ars sympathetic to Heller do not identify historical support for the hunting
point.  An article co-authored by Clayton E. Cramer, Nicholas J. Johnson, and
George A. Mocsary applies the original understanding approach comprehen-
sively to the “abundant evidence about the public understanding of the Sec-
ond Amendment between 1791 and the Civil War.”129  They find support for
the individual right view, and note that there “was something of a divide as to
the purpose of the right,”130 but nowhere do they indicate that hunting was
one of those possible purposes.
2. Understanding the Game Laws
The best historical case for an original understanding argument in favor
of the right to hunt is the one identified by scholars like Calvin Massey, who
wrote long before Heller that “[s]ome Americans, remembering the game
laws of England that disarmed the yeomanry to prevent poaching the gen-
try’s game, wanted to protect the people’s right to hold and to use arms for
purposes of hunting.”131  But Massey stops short of saying that this particular
desire was written into the Second Amendment,132 and a careful review of
the historical sources indicates that opposition to the game laws—while his-
126 Heller itself is generally read as employing an original public meaning approach to
interpretation, Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56
UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1346 (2009), though its fidelity to that approach is not uniform, id. at
1358 (noting that “Justice Scalia does not even pretend to make . . . a claim” that Ameri-
cans were forbidden from carrying firearms in schools and government buildings before
1791, despite Heller’s endorsement of such prohibitions).
127 Heller, 554 U.S. at 599.
128 See, e.g., Keith A. Ehrman & Dennis A. Henigan, The Second Amendment in the Twenti-
eth Century: Have You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 5, 33 (1989); H. Rich-
ard Uviller & William G. Merkel, The Second Amendment in Context: The Case of the Vanishing
Predicate, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 403, 506 (2000).
129 Clayton E. Cramer, Nicholas J. Johnson & George A. Mocsary, “This Right Is Not
Allowed by Governments that Are Afraid of the People”: The Public Meaning of the Second Amend-
ment When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 823, 825 (2010).
130 Id.
131 Massey, supra note 92, at 1135; see also LEONARD LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF
RIGHTS 136–37 (1999) (discussing game laws and concluding that “[t]he right to have arms
is an inheritance from England”).
132 See Massey, supra note 92, at 1135–36 (referring to hunting as one of “multiple and
partially conflicting concerns” in a list of “theoretical purposes” for the right to bear arms).
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torically significant—did not inspire the creation or recognition of a right to
hunt with guns.
The English game laws have long been intertwined with Second Amend-
ment debates.  Though the connection between the two may well have been
exaggerated,133 the game laws do provide a backdrop for understanding the
right to keep and bear arms as it existed in England prior to the ratification
of the Second Amendment—an important source, especially since the right
to bear arms is often described as a “pre-existing” right.134  Some scholars
argue, for example, that St. George Tucker’s influential edition of Black-
stone’s Commentaries “described the Second Amendment right to arms as an
expansion of the arms right from the 1689 English Declaration of Right, and
as including the right to arms for self-defense and for hunting.”135
This reads too much into Tucker.  He did focus on the game laws, but
did not describe the right to keep and bear arms as including a right to do so
for hunting.  In the interests of thoroughness, here is Tucker’s commentary
on the text of the Second Amendment, including all references to the game
laws and hunting:
This may be considered as the true palladium of liberty . . . . The right of self
defence is the first law of nature: in most governments it has been the study
of rulers to confine this right within the narrowest limits possible.  Wherever
standing armies are kept up, and the right of the people to keep and bear
arms is, under any colour or pretext whatsoever, prohibited, liberty, if not
already annihilated, is on the brink of destruction.  In England, the people
have been disarmed, generally, under the specious pretext of preserving the
game: a never failing lure to bring over the landed aristocracy to support any
measure, under that mask, though calculated for very different purposes.
True it is, their bill of rights seems at first view to counteract this policy: but
the right of bearing arms is confined to protestants, and the words suitable
to their condition and degree, have been interpreted to authorise the prohi-
bition of keeping a gun or other engine for the destruction of game, to any
farmer, or inferior tradesman, or other person not qualified to kill game.  So
that not one man in five hundred can keep a gun in his house without being
subject to a penalty.136
This passage has often been invoked as recognizing a Second Amend-
ment right to hunt.  Randy Barnett and Don Kates, for example, point to it
133 See Patrick J. Charles, “Arms for Their Defence”?: An Historical, Legal, and Textual Analy-
sis of the English Right to Have Arms and Whether the Second Amendment Should Be Incorporated in
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 351 (2009).  For present purposes, I
accept the connection but argue that it does not support a right to hunt.
134 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008) (emphasis omitted).
135 David B. Kopel, The Right to Arms in the Living Constitution, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE
NOVO 99, 104; see also Kopel, supra note 99, at 130 n.88 (“Various common law sources
(such as St. George Tucker’s enormously influential American edition of Blackstone) like-
wise support hunting rights.”).
136 Appendix to 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *300 (St. George Tucker ed.,
1803).  I assume that this is the passage Kopel has in mind, as it is the only plausible
candidate.
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and say that “the militia is only the second of three purposes mentioned for
the right to arms.  The first is self-defense and the third is hunting.”137
Tucker, however, was not concerned with a right to hunt, but with the
use of the game laws as a pretext for generalized disarmament and oppres-
sion.  To be sure, he bemoaned the English game laws—both in this passage
and elsewhere in the Commentaries—for disarming citizens, not for denying
them the ability to hunt: “Whoever examines the forest, and game laws in the
British code, will readily perceive that the right of keeping arms is effectually
taken away from the people of England.”138  Tucker’s complaint was that the
English had “been disarmed, generally, under the specious pretext of pre-
serving the game,” and that this “lure” had gained the support of the “landed
aristocracy . . . under that mask, though calculated for very different pur-
poses.”139  The loss of hunting opportunities is not the problem.
William Rawle has played a similar role in debates about the right to
hunt.  Barnett and Kates say that Rawle “did give first and most emphatic
mention to the militia as a reason for the [Second Amendment] guarantee,
but also mentioned self-defense and hunting.”140  What Rawle said is that
Blackstone recognized “that the prevention of popular insurrections and
resistance to government by disarming the people, is oftener meant than
avowed by the makers of forest and game laws.”141  Rawle also wrote that
although English subjects have a right to arms, “[a]n arbitrary code for the
preservation of game in that country has long disgraced them.”142  This cer-
tainly constitutes a “mention[ ]” of hunting, but it is a far cry from calling it
“a reason for the guarantee” of a right to keep and bear arms.  Like Tucker,
Rawle simply noted that nominal anti-hunting laws were a threat to the peo-
ple’s ability to keep and bear arm for any reason, not that the right necessa-
rily encompassed hunting.
A review of the game laws’ history helps explain why.  Restrictions on
hunting and the use of guns for that purpose were longstanding in England.
Many of the earliest legal restrictions imposed property requirements on
137 Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, Under Fire: The New Consensus on the Second Amend-
ment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1139, 1220 (1996).
138 Kopel, supra note 81, at 1333 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *144
n.41 (St. George Tucker ed., 1803)).  It seems that Kopel is citing Volume 2 of Blackstone’s
Commentaries. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *143 n.41 (St. George Tucker
ed., 1803).
139 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 136, at *300.
140 Barnett & Kates, supra note 137, at 1221 (citing WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 122 (2d ed. 1825)).  Though the text is
correct, there seems to be a minor error in the citation—the passage appears at WILLIAM
RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 125–26 (2d ed.
1829);  and at WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 122 (1st ed. 1825).
141 WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
122–23 (1st ed. 1825).
142 Kopel, supra note 81, at 1334 (quoting WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 122 (1st ed. 1825)).
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hunters,143 thereby preserving hunting as a pastime for the nobility and aris-
tocracy—a theme that would persist for hundreds of years.  Beginning in the
early 1600s during the reign of James I, the game laws became increasingly
stringent, raising the property requirements and prohibiting the use of cer-
tain weapons for taking certain game.144  These changes were not motivated
by a desire to protect game, but because of James I’s fear of insurrection145
and desire to disarm the supposedly violent lower classes.146
Restrictions became even more severe under Charles II.147  Perhaps
most notorious was the 1670 Game Act, which historian Joyce Lee Malcolm
has described as having “deprived the great majority of the community of all
legal right to have firearms.”148  It has been said that this law was later
invoked by James II as grounds for ordering the militia to search private
homes for “muskets or guns” because “a great many persons not qualified by
law under pretence of shooting matches keep muskets or other guns in their
houses.”149  Fifty years later, the Black Act was passed, nominally to prosecute
poachers (who would blacken their faces for purposes of disguise) in the
Waltham forests.150  It, too, is frequently described as a tool of disarmament
and oppression.151
These game laws might well have been on the minds of many who sup-
ported the inclusion of the Second Amendment in the Constitution.  But just
because those laws nominally related to hunting does not mean that the Sec-
ond Amendment does.  The problem with the game laws was not that they
violated a right to hunt with firearms, but that they denied other asserted
rights, among them the right to armed self-defense against private violence
143 Id. at 1340 (discussing fourteenth-century laws); see also JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO
KEEP AND BEAR ARMS 72, 198 n.83 (1994) (giving an example of a law providing that
“[n]one shall hunt but they which have a sufficient living”).
144 MALCOLM, supra note 143, at 13 (describing the 1604 Act, 1605 Act, and 1609 Act).
145 See, e.g., Lois G. Schwoerer, To Hold and Bear Arms: The English Perspective, 76 CHI.-
KENT. L. REV. 27, 35 (2000).
146 See, e.g., T. Markus Funk, Is the True Meaning of the Second Amendment Really Such a
Riddle? Tracing the Historical “Origins of an Anglo-American Right”, 39 HOW. L.J. 411, 421 n.36
(1995) (book review); see also generally Kopel, supra note 81.
147 Robert Hardaway et al., The Inconvenient Militia Clause of the Second Amendment: Why
the Supreme Court Declines to Resolve the Debate over the Right to Bear Arms, 16 ST. JOHN’S J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 41, 65 (2002).
148 MALCOLM, supra note 143, at 65; Powe, supra note 81, at 1347 (noting that the law
“made possession of weapons illegal for most people”).
149 William S. Fields & David T. Hardy, The Militia and the Constitution: A Legal History,
136 MIL. L. REV. 1, 13 (1992) (citing 2 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, DOMESTIC, James II,
1212, at 314 (Dec. 6, 1686)).
150 For a more thoughtful treatment, see generally E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND
HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT (1975).
151 See, e.g., JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, GUNS AND VIOLENCE: THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE 64–71
(2002) (describing the Black Act as “draconian” and “repressive”); see also generally P.B.
MUNSCHE, GENTLEMEN AND POACHERS: THE ENGLISH GAME LAWS 1671–1831 (1981) (argu-
ing that the Game Act of 1671 was part of the systematic class-based restriction of weapons
available to the peasantry that continued up through the Waltham Black Acts).
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or government tyranny.  This is why Tucker noted that the laws were passed
under the “specious pretext” of protecting game.
3. Evidence from the States
Nevertheless, the historical record is not entirely silent with regard to
hunting and the right to keep and bear arms.  Perhaps the most commonly
cited piece of pro-hunting language appeared in a proposal from the Dissent
of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania declaring that:
[T]he people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and
their own state, or the United States, or for the purpose of killing game; and
no law shall be passed for disarming the people or any of them, unless for
crimes committed, or real danger of public injury from individuals; and as
standing armies in the time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they ought not
to be kept up; and that the military shall be kept under strict subordination
to and be governed by the civil powers.152
The next proposition in the proposal provided:
The inhabitants of the several states shall have liberty to fowl and hunt in
seasonable times, on the lands they hold, and on all other lands in the
United States not inclosed, and in like manner to fish in all navigable waters,
and others not private property, without being restrained therein by any laws
to be passed by the legislature of the United States.153
Supporters of a broad Second Amendment right have often pointed to
this language as supporting the “individual rights” view of the Amend-
ment,154 and even as supporting the idea of a Second Amendment right to
hunt.155
152 Proposition 7, “Right to Bear Arms,” The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority
of the Convention of Pennsylvania to Their Constituents (Dec. 18, 1787), reprinted in THE CASE
AGAINST THE CONSTITUTION 77 (John F. Manley & Kenneth M. Dolbeare eds., 1987).
153 Id., Proposition 8, “Liberty to Fowl and Hunt.”
154 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 604 (2008) (“[T]he highly
influential minority proposal in Pennsylvania . . . with its reference to hunting, plainly
referred to an individual right.”); David B. Kopel & Clayton E. Cramer, Credentials Are No
Substitute for Accuracy: Nathan Kozuskanich, Stephen Halbrook, and the Role of the Historian, 19
WIDENER L.J. 343, 371 (2010) (citing the Proposal to support the argument that
“[h]unting, or ‘killing game,’ is obviously a personal, nonmilitia purpose for which one
could ‘bear arms’” (quoting THE ADDRESS AND REASONS OF DISSENT OF THE MINORITY OF
THE CONVENTION OF PENNSYLVANIA TO THEIR CONSTITUENTS, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS
AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES: THE CLASHES AND COMPROMISES THAT
GAVE BIRTH TO OUR FORM OF GOVERNMENT 237, 239–40 (Ralph Ketcham ed., New Ameri-
can Library 1986) (1787))); Thomas B. McAffee & Michael J. Quinlan, Bringing Forward the
Right to Keep and Bear Arms: Do Text, History, or Precedent Stand in the Way?, 75 N.C. L. REV.
781, 847 (1997) (“This Pennsylvania minority proposal . . . undercuts completely the idea
that the connection between the right to arms and military issues stands as a barrier to the
individual rights understanding of the right to bear arms.”).
155 See, e.g., McAffee & Quinlan, supra note 154, at 861.
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But the framers rejected this language.156  And it is hard to build a case
for a constitutional right to hunt on the rejected language of a dissenting
faction from a single state.157  It seems more reasonable to conclude, as Paul
Finkelman does, that the Pennsylvania minority’s proposals “help us under-
stand the intentions of the framers of the Second Amendment.  This under-
standing, however, is a negative one.  By seeing what the framers of the
Second Amendment did not do, we can better understand what they did
do.”158
Marginally better support for the right to bear arms for hunting can be
found in the fact that two states had constitutional provisions guaranteeing a
right to hunt.  Pennsylvania adopted for itself language similar to that pro-
posed by the Antifederalist Minority, adding a provision (Section 43) in the
state’s Declaration of Rights stating: “The inhabitants of this state shall have
liberty to fowl and hunt in seasonable times on the lands they hold, and on
all other lands therein not inclosed; and in like manner to fish in all boatable
waters, and others not private property.”159 Separately, Article XIII of the
Pennsylvania Constitution provided that “the people have a right to bear
arms for the defence of themselves and the State.”160  The Vermont Constitu-
tion similarly provided:
The inhabitants of this State, shall have liberty, to hunt and fowl, in seasona-
ble times, on the lands they hold, and on other lands (not enclosed;), and in
like manner, to fish in all boatable and other waters, not private property,
under proper regulations, to be hereafter made and provided by the Gen-
eral Assembly.161
156 Paul Finkelman, “A Well Regulated Militia”: The Second Amendment in Historical Perspec-
tive, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 195, 208 (2000) (“Madison and his colleagues in the First Con-
gress emphatically rejected the goals and the language of the Pennsylvania Antifederalists
on these issues.”); Miller, supra note 4, at 1348–49 (“The Framers rejected a version of the
Second Amendment that would have explicitly preserved a right to arms for hunting.”).
157 Amar, supra note 75, at 902 (referring to the Pennsylvania Anti-Federalists’ pro-
posed language, and explaining “[m]y claim is not that no one at the Founding ever used
the phrase ‘bear Arms’ to encompass, say, hunting.  In fact, we can find such uses—but
they are rare, the proverbial linguistic exceptions that prove the rule . . . .” (footnote
omitted)).
158 Finkelman, supra note 156, at 208.
159 PA. CONST. of 1776, § 43; see 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 3083 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909).
160 PA. CONST. of 1776, art. XIII; see 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
159, at 3083.  It is not uncommon to see the two provisions cited together, even though
only one refers to arms. See, e.g., Derek P. Langhauser, Gun Regulation on Campus: Under-
standing Heller and Preparing for Subsequent Litigation and Legislation, 36 J.C. & U.L. 63, 72
(2009) (“Pennsylvania’s 1776 Declaration of Rights expressly provided its citizens with self-
defense and sporting rights: ‘[T]he people have a right to bear arms for the defence of
themselves and the state’ and ‘shall have the liberty to fowl and hunt in seasonable times on
the lands they hold, and on all other lands therein not inclosed.’” (alteration in original)).
161 VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. I, § 15.  Taking a belt-and-suspenders approach, Vermonters
actually included this guarantee twice. See id.; id. ch. II, § 39; see also 6 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 3191, 3753–54, 3760 (Fran-
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-1\NDL103.txt unknown Seq: 30  8-DEC-15 16:46
162 notre dame law review [vol. 91:1
And, like Pennsylvania’s, the Vermont Constitution separately provided that
“the people have a right to bear arms, for the defence of themselves and the
State.”162
State constitutional guarantees of the right to keep and bear arms have
often been said to support a Second Amendment right to keep and bear
arms for private purposes.163  For example, Eugene Volokh pointed out in a
pre-Heller article that many state constitutional provisions contained the same
kind of prefatory language as the Second Amendment.164  This was
presented, and taken by many, to support the individual rights view—since
the Amendment had similar language to state constitutional provisions, and
the latter had been interpreted to protect an individual right, the thought
was that the two should be read in harmony.165
But these same state constitutional provisions provide strong evidence
against a Second Amendment right to hunt.  If the commonality of prefatory
clauses in state constitutions should influence our understanding of the pref-
atory clause in the Second Amendment, then the relative rarity of “right to
hunt” provisions in early state constitutions suggests that the authors of the
Second Amendment did not mean to protect such a right.  Their existence
indicates that the framers knew perfectly well how to protect a constitutional
right to hunt and that they chose not to.166
Moreover, even if one accepts the Vermont and Pennsylvania provisions
as statements of the original understanding of the Second Amendment, they
provide little support for a right to bear arms for hunting.  Neither provision
even mentions arms-bearing in conjunction with hunting.  Indeed, both con-
stitutions separately protected “a right to bear arms for the defence of them-
cis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) (including both guarantees in the subsequent Vermont Con-
stitution of 1786).
162 VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. I, § 15.
163 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Was the Right to Keep and Bear Arms Conditioned on Service in
an Organized Militia?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 237, 252 (2004) (book review).
164 Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793, 814–21
(1998).
165 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577 (2008).
166 Id. at 643 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (contrasting the language of the Second Amend-
ment with that of the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, arguing that the omission of
private uses like hunting from the former shows the framers’ “single-minded focus . . . on
military uses of firearms, which they viewed in the context of service in state militias”); Paul
Finkelman, It Really Was About a Well Regulated Militia, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 267, 276 (2008)
(noting that proposals of the Pennsylvania minority, such as the inclusion of a right to
hunt and fish, were intentionally omitted from the Constitution and arguing that “it is
clear that if Madison and the First Congress had wanted to produce an Amendment that
protected an individual’s right to own weapons, for self-preservation or hunting—the kind
of Amendment Justice Scalia incorrectly claims they did produce—the ideas and wording
were available”); Herz, supra note 45, at 66 (noting that, while the founders were aware of
broader right-to-bear-arms formulations that explicitly included hunting, “they refused to
adopt several such proposals offered by the Antifederalists and by the various state ratifying
conventions”).
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selves and the state.”167  Their provisions for hunting did not mention arms-
bearing; their provisions for arms-bearing did not mention hunting.
The focus of the Vermont and Pennsylvania provisions was not on arms
but on where a person could hunt.  The Pennsylvania guarantee, for example,
referred to the “liberty to fowl and hunt in seasonable times on the lands they
hold, and on all other lands therein not inclosed.”168  Vermont’s nearly iden-
tical guarantee protected the “liberty to hunt and fowl, in seasonable times,
on the lands they hold, and on other lands (not enclosed[ ]).”169  Again, the
history is illuminating.  Though the issue has largely receded from memory,
in the late 1700s the debate about hunting was largely about the liberty of
would-be hunters to pursue their quarry onto enclosed land.170  Among
other things, the game acts limited people’s access to hunting grounds, as
Tucker’s reference to the “landed aristocracy” suggests.  Right-to-hunt provi-
sions, then, seem to be more about access to land than the right to hunt, let
alone to carry arms while doing so.171
Consider the fact that James Madison, then a Virginia legislator, intro-
duced a “Bill for the Preservation of Deer” that would have penalized anyone
who would “bear a gun out of his inclosed ground.”172  Madison apparently
did so at the urging of Thomas Jefferson,173 and so both men have often
167 PA. CONST. of 1776, art. XIII.; VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. I, § 15 (same); 6 FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 161 at 3741.
168 PA. CONST. of 1776, § 43.
169 VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. I, § 39.
170 Brian Sawers, Keeping Up with the Jonses: Making Sure Your History Is Just as Wrong as
Everyone Else’s, 111 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 21, 25 (2013) (“In the eighteenth cen-
tury, legislatures shaped the boundaries of private property law by enacting statutes that
defined trespasses and acknowledged the right to hunt on private land.”); see also Kopel,
supra note 81, at 1339 (stating that in England, “the idea of commoners hunting was anath-
ema.  Unlike in the United States, private aristocratic estates held most English hunting
land, and hunting by commoners was generally illegal.” (footnote omitted)); Hunting,
OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE MODERN WORLD (Peter N. Stearns ed., 2008) (noting that
under the Black Act, “there was much more at stake than the life of some selected wild
animals in the forest and the private privileges of parts of the nobility.  At stake was also the
established political order itself and the establishment of a new sense of property rights,
namely rights with a strict sense of exclusivity.”).
It has been argued that even Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. 1805), the fox hunting
dispute that has long been a staple of property courses, was in fact motivated by a dispute
over hunting on unenclosed land, rather than about when a hunter can claim ownership
over pursued game.  Bethany R. Berger, It’s Not About the Fox: The Untold History of Pierson v.
Post, 55 DUKE L.J. 1089, 1090 (2006).
171 Halbrook, supra note 5, at 198–99 (noting, in the course of “exploring the potential
contours of the right to hunt,” that the state right to hunt provisions “sought to guard
against royal privilege as practiced in England”).
172 Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Preservation of Deer (1785), in 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 443–44 (Barbara B. Oberg & J. Jefferson Looney eds., digital edition 2008); see
also SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA 29 (2006).
173 David Thomas Konig, Thomas Jefferson’s Armed Citizenry and the Republican Militia, 1
ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 250, 270–71 (2008).  Jefferson’s apparent concern was the protection of
game.  He complained that, in the colonial period, “idle people [had made it] a practice,
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been conscripted into Second Amendment battles.174  Gun-rights supporters
have traditionally invoked the language of the Virginia law to show that the
phrase “keep and bear arms” in the Second Amendment is not limited to
militia service.175  (This elides the potentially significant difference between
bearing a “gun” and bearing “arms,” but that debate has been played out
elsewhere.176)  Madison, they point out, authored the Second Amendment,
and since the Virginia law used “bear” in a decidedly non-military context
then the Second Amendment should arguably be read in the same fashion.
But if the Virginia bill is a reliable guide as to whether the Amendment pro-
tects a non-militia right, then it also seems sensible to use it as evidence that
hunting is not covered by the right.  Since the game bill shows that Madison
clearly knew how to draft language about bearing arms for purposes of hunt-
ing, shouldn’t the omission of that language in the Second Amendment be
significant?
These sources have been picked over before, in the context of the long-
running debate about whether the Second Amendment protects an “individ-
ual” right to keep and bear arms.  The point of this brief discussion is not to
re-engage that question—as a matter of constitutional doctrine, the answer is
plainly yes.  My concern here is whether the individual right recognized in
Heller includes a right to hunt.  And even if these sources suggest the exis-
in severe frozen weather, and deep snows, to destroy deer, in great numbers, in great
numbers, with dogs, so that the whole breed is likely to be destroyed in the inhabited parts
of the colony.”  Jefferson, supra note 172, at 444.
174 BAUM, supra note 64, at 256 (“Poor Thomas Jefferson probably had more guns
stuffed into his long-dead mouth than anybody.”); see also Christina Zdanowicz, Jefferson:
The Face of the Modern Gun Debate, CNN (July 19, 2013, 1:00 PM), http://www.cnn.com/
interactive/2013/07/us/jefferson-rorschach-guns/index.html (noting various pro-gun
quotes misattributed to Jefferson).  Interestingly, Jefferson has also been deployed, again
with invented quotes, to fight against the hunting view of the Second Amendment: “The
majority of American’s [sic] today, believe the reason that our fore fathers [sic] wanted the
people to have the right to keep and bear arms was for the purpose of self defense against
criminals, hunting, etc.  This is NOT the primary reason for the enactment of the 2nd
Amendment.  Let’s let Thomas Jefferson explain it for us: ‘The strongest reason for the people
to retain the right to keep and bear arms is, as a last resort, to protect themselves against tyranny in
government.’”  Williams, Militia Movement, supra note 87, at 894 (quoting MILITIA OF MON-
TANA, THE MILITIA 3 (pamphlet from Militia of Montana in Noxon, Montana)).
175 See, e.g., United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 231 (5th Cir. 2001); Barnett, supra
note 163, at 244 (offering the game bill and its “bear a gun” language as the first example
under the header “Early Uses of ‘Bear Arms’ Outside the Military Context”); Clayton E.
Cramer & Joseph Edward Olson, What Did “Bear Arms” Mean in the Second Amendment?, 6
GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 511, 517–18 (2008); Stephen P. Halbrook, What the Framers Intended:
A Linguistic Analysis of the Right to “Bear Arms”, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 151, 153 (1986).
176 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 646–47 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
see also PATRICK J. CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT 137 (2009) (reviewing hunting laws
through the late eighteenth century and not finding any that used the phrase “bear
arms”); Amar, supra note 75, at 891 (“The Amendment . . . uses a distinctly military phrase:
‘bear Arms.’  A deer hunter or target shooter carries a gun but does not, properly speak-
ing, bear arms.” (emphasis omitted)); Powe, supra note 81, at 1337 (“No one has heard a
hunter state that he is ‘going to bear arms and shoot ducks.’”).
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tence of an individual right to keep and bear arms, that does not mean that
they support an individual right to hunt with them.
There is one final source of law—one not rooted in original understand-
ing—that might support a finding that the Second Amendment directly pro-
tects the right to hunt.  Contemporary state constitutional law can sometimes
provide a useful interpretive guide for the federal Constitution.177  In addi-
tion to the Vermont and Pennsylvania provisions cited above, some states
have recently enacted constitutional provisions guaranteeing the right to
hunt,178 and some specifically include a right to hunt with guns.179  Should
these right-to-hunt provisions also influence interpretation of the Second
Amendment?
The best answer is “not yet.”  Only seven states guarantee a right to bear
arms for hunting; of these, six were adopted in the 1980s, and one was
adopted in the 1990s.180  This is not the kind of longstanding or near-unani-
mous agreement one finds with regard to other state constitutional matters
that might properly influence federal counterparts, such as the use of a “rea-
sonableness” test in evaluating gun regulation.181  Even if one includes right
to hunt provisions that do not contain arms-bearing guarantees, barely a
third of states are represented.  And the very fact that the NRA and other
organizations fought to add these provisions to state constitutions suggests
that the right to hunt was not otherwise protected by the Federal Constitu-
tion—a fact that undermines, rather than supports, the argument for a Sec-
ond Amendment right to hunt.
B. Hunting is Peripherally Protected
Just because hunting and recreational uses of firearms are not directly
covered by the Second Amendment does not mean that they necessarily lack
any constitutional protection.  Sometimes activities are covered by the Consti-
tution even though—in fact, because—they are peripheral to other activities
that are explicitly protected.  It is possible that they are protected either
instrumentally, because they are useful to effectuate a core interest, or
penumbrally, because they constitute some lesser-but-still-constitutional inter-
177 See generally Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State Constitutional Law, 84 S. CAL.
L. REV. 323 (2011).
178 Halbrook, supra note 5, at 229–33; Volokh, supra note 4, at 1448 (counting seven
states guaranteeing a “right to keep and bear arms . . . for hunting and recreational use”
(alteration in original)); see also Halbrook, supra note 5, at 198 (“Currently, ten states rec-
ognize hunting as a constitutional guarantee, and proposed amendments are pending in
other states.”).
179 Halbrook, supra note 5, at 229–33.
180 Id.; see also Amar, supra note 75, at 902 n.37 (“These state constitutional references
to hunting and recreation appear to be of a distinctly recent vintage, enacted in the 1980s
and 1990s.”).
181 Blocher, supra note 177, at 383–84 (arguing, inter alia, that federal courts interpret-
ing the Second Amendment should consider adopting the same standard of review that
has been nearly unanimously applied by state courts interpreting their own gun-rights
provisions).
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est.  This set of arguments provides the strongest support for a Second
Amendment right to hunt.  And yet that support has important limitations.
The idea behind instrumental protection for hunting is straightforward:
using arms for purposes like hunting and sport shooting can help a person
develop proficiency in arms, which can in turn be useful for central Second
Amendment purposes like self-defense and the prevention of tyranny.182
Heller cited Thomas Cooley’s “massively popular 1868 Treatise on Constitu-
tional Limitations” to this effect: “[T]o bear arms implies something more
than the mere keeping; it implies the learning to handle and use them . . . it
implies the right to meet for voluntary discipline in arms, observing in doing
so the laws of public order.”183  Contemporary scholars like Glenn Harlan
Reynolds invoke and employ similar language: “The right to possess firearms
for protection implies a corresponding right to acquire and maintain profi-
ciency in their use; the core right wouldn’t mean much without the training
and practice that make it effective.”184  And some version of this conclusion
has appeared in post-Heller case law, most prominently the Seventh Circuit’s
conclusion in Ezell v. City of Chicago that range training is not categorically
unprotected by the Second Amendment.185
The instrumental argument would therefore protect hunting because,
and presumably to the degree that, it is useful for core Second Amendment
interests.  The penumbral argument would not focus on that utility directly,
but rather on whether hunting and recreation bear sufficient relationship to
activities that are undoubtedly protected—they would be covered as “conve-
nient spinoffs,”186 rather than as facilitators.  Similar arguments are some-
182 Reynolds, Second Amendment Penumbras, supra note 28, at 250.
183 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 616–18 (2008); see also Andrews v. State,
50 Tenn. 165, 178 (1871) (concluding that individual right to bear arms under state consti-
tution includes “the right to practice their use, in order to attain to this efficiency”);
O’Shea, Defensive Arms, supra note 116, at 369 (“As for target shooting: since the Second
Amendment protects the ability to keep and use arms for self-defense, this also seems to
entail the right to practice regularly with one’s arms (subject to ordinary safety regulations)
so as to be able to defend oneself effectively.”).
184 Reynolds, Second Amendment Penumbras, supra note 28, at 250 (quoting Ezell v. City
of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 704 (7th Cir. 2011)).  Reynolds concludes that “[t]he right to
practice at a firing range, then, is at the very least one of the aspects of the Second Amend-
ment right to arms that reinforces its core purpose.” Id.
185 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011).
186 Seth Mydans, California Gun Control Law Runs Into Rebellion, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24,
1990), http://www.nytimes.com/1990/12/24/us/california-gun-control-law-runs-into-
rebellion.html?pagewanted=all (quoting Fred Romero, NRA’s field representative for
Southern California: “The Second Amendment is not there to protect the interests of
hunters, sports shooters and casual plinkers, although those are convenient spinoffs . . . .
The Second Amendment is there as a balance of power.”); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, BILL
OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 49 (2000) (“[T]o see the . . . amendment as
primarily concerned with an individual right to hunt or to protect one’s home is like view-
ing the heart of the speech and assembly clauses as the right of persons to meet to play
bridge or to have sex.”); Akhil Reed Amar, An(other) Afterword on the Bill of Rights, 87 GEO.
L.J. 2347, 2361 (1999) (“[T]he Second Amendment as originally drafted seems to me
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times made for First Amendment protection of nude dancing, which is
covered not because it aids core political speech, but because it is itself some
kind of marginally protected speech.187  Under this approach, the question is
whether hunting and recreation bear sufficient connection to core purposes
like self-defense, not whether they are useful to advancing it.188
These are novel problems for the Second Amendment, but not for con-
stitutional law.  First Amendment doctrine—frequently if controversially used
as a guide to the Second189—reflects difficult decisions about whether to
cover, and how much to protect, activities falling outside the Amendment’s
“core” of political speech.  Constitutional rights often need room to breathe.
But that does not mean that every activity that facilitates a constitutional right
is itself constitutionally protected.  Free speech would presumably be facili-
tated by access to court records190 and a right to education,191 but neither of
those things are covered by the First Amendment.  And even when such
instrumental or penumbral rights are constitutionally covered, they often
receive lessened protection.192
The emerging Second Amendment standard of review seems to incorpo-
rate these two dimensions of coverage and protection.  Courts generally
apply a two-part test, which first asks whether a challenged law burdens con-
duct within the scope of the Second Amendment, and then asks whether the
burden can be justified in light of the burden imposed.193  The first of these
inquires is about coverage—whether a particular activity implicates the Sec-
more about the army than about hunting, more about collective than individual self-
defense.”); Michael P. O’Shea, Why Firearm Federalism Beats Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 359, 363 (2014) (arguing that “hunting arms, as such, deserve ‘penumbral’ protec-
tion under the Second Amendment”).
187 Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991).
188 Kopel, supra note 111, at 327 (“[W]hile sporting uses such as hunting are part of
the Second Amendment, the ‘core’ and ‘central component’ of the Second Amendment is
self-defense.”); Reynolds, Critical Guide, supra note 101, at 480 (“Recreation and sport, to
the extent they are protected at all, are covered only penumbrally; the Second Amend-
ment is not about sport or recreation.”).
189 See Gregory P. Magarian, Speaking Truth to Firepower: How the First Amendment Destabi-
lizes the Second, 91 TEX. L. REV. 49 (2012); see also Joseph Blocher, Second Things First: What
Free Speech Can and Can’t Say About Guns, 91 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 37 (2012).
190 IDT Corp. v. eBay, 709 F.3d 1220, 1222, 1225 (8th Cir. 2013) (agreeing with “[t]en
other circuits” that “the common-law right of access applies to judicial records in civil pro-
ceedings,” but following those other circuits in refusing to uphold the right of access under
the First Amendment).
191 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35–36 (1973) (dismissing
appellees’ contention that education is a fundamental right because it is essential to effec-
tive exercise of First Amendment freedoms).
192 See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557,
562–63 (1980) (“The Constitution therefore accords a lesser protection to commercial
speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression.” (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978))).
193 See, e.g., Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. ATF, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012); Georgia-
Carry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1260 n.34 (11th Cir. 2012); Heller v. District of
Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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ond Amendment at all.194  The second inquiry is about protection—whether
the challenged law can be sufficiently justified in light of the burdens it
places on the constitutionally covered activity.  Stronger justifications are
required for laws that burden the “core” Second Amendment interest of self-
defense.195
Assuming that hunting’s instrumental or penumbral relationship to the
Second Amendment’s core is enough to survive the threshold coverage
inquiry, the second question would be whether the law’s burdens are appro-
priate in light of the governmental interests involved—a test that is some-
times treated as a sliding scale196 and sometimes as intermediate scrutiny.197
This is a difficult question to answer in the abstract, since it would of course
depend on the details of the law and its implementation.  Whatever else may
be said in favor of extending constitutional protection to hunting and sport
shooting, they are not the “core” of the Second Amendment.198  As Heller
and McDonald make clear, the “core” and “central component” of the right is
self-defense.199  Because hunting is not a core Second Amendment interest,
government interests in regulating hunting-related activities need not be as
strong.
If hunting and recreation do in fact fall within the scope of the Second
Amendment, that does not mean they are immune from regulation—even a
flat ban on hunting might nonetheless be constitutional.  If training with
arms is constitutionally protected only because it facilitates expertise, then
providing alternative methods of attaining that expertise should obviate a
constitutional claim for hunting.  The availability of a shooting range would
undermine the argument in favor a right to hunt, for example, and vice
versa.  Even an advanced simulator might be sufficient, if what the constitu-
tion requires is a means of attaining firearms proficiency.  This would of
course require courts to determine whether training opportunities are ade-
194 Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 2013) (finding that concealed
carrying is not covered by the Second Amendment).
195 Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Caba v.
Weaknecht, 64 A.3d 39, 57–59 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012) (concluding that the right to bear
arms for self-defense “is an enumerated, constitutionally-protected interest that, in our
view, is worthy of more protection than an interest in engaging in the sport of hunting”).
196 See, e.g., Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 93–97 (2d Cir. 2012); Nat’l
Rifle Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 195–98.
197 See, e.g., Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1260–64; United States v. Staten, 666 F.3d 154, 160–67
(4th Cir. 2011).
198 Reynolds, Second Amendment Penumbras, supra note 28, at 250 (“The right to practice
at a firing range, then, is at the very least one of the aspects of the Second Amendment
right to arms that reinforces its core purpose.”); see also Reynolds, Critical Guide, supra note
101, at 480 (“Recreation and sport, to the extent they are protected at all, are covered only
penumbrally; the Second Amendment is not about sport or recreation.”).
199 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599, 630 (2008).
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quate, but that is not necessarily any harder than the “alternative channels of
communication” analysis they already perform in some free speech cases.200
If a law were to ban all forms of practice shooting, it would properly be
subject to the burden-testing, interest-balancing second prong of the test.  In
other words, it would have to be justified in light of the private burdens and
public interests.  This too is an empirical question, and its answer would
depend on what evidence a government could marshal to prove the strength
of its interest.  In addition to the usual asserted harms from gun ownership,
activities like hunting carry risks of their own,201 which the government has a
legitimate interest in preventing.  Against this, gun owners would assert their
need to practice with arms, so as to acquire and maintain proficiency in their
use.  If a municipality were to make training a prerequisite for gun owner-
ship, and then make such training virtually impossible to obtain, the Second
Amendment arguments would be even stronger.202
Sometimes these private interests might be particularly weighty.  For
example, people occasionally “bear arms” against animals for reasons that are
neither recreational nor intended for training.203  Consider the case of a per-
son who is threatened by a wild animal, or who wants to bear arms because
she has legitimate fear that she will be.204  Gun-rights advocates often point
to a letter written by Samuel Nasson of Massachusetts to his Congressman,
200 The First Amendment permits “regulations of the time, place, and manner of
expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant govern-
ment interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.”  Frisby v.
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’
Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)); see also Joseph Blocher & Darrell Miller, Lethality, Public
Carry, and Adequate Alternatives, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. (forthcoming 2015).
201 Thomas B. Cole & Michael J. Patetta, Hunting Firearm Injuries, North Carolina, 78(12)
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1585, 1585 (1988) (“Approximately one-fifth of unintentional firearm
injuries have been attributed to hunting.”); see also State v. Bontrager, 683 N.E.2d 126,
131?32 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (upholding Ohio ordinance requiring the wearing of orange
vests while hunting as a reasonable firearm regulation, noting the risks inherent in hunting
and comparing the regulation to the requirement of seatbelt use by drivers); Lolomai
O¨rnehult & Anders Eriksson, Accidental Firearm Fatalities During Hunting, 8(2) AM. J. FOREN-
SIC MED. & PATHOLOGY 112, 112 (1987) (studying accidental firearm fatalities in Sweden).
202 See, e.g., Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 689–90 (7th Cir. 2011) (striking
down municipal ordinance that required one hour of range training while prohibiting
ranges in the city).
203 Green, supra note 121, at 184 (noting that hunting “is itself valuable not merely
because it provides food for one’s family, but also because it is an important form of recre-
ation and the expression of a particular conception of the good life”).  Whether hunting
can be defended purely as recreation is a hotly contested issue.  Cass Sunstein says that it
cannot: “We ought to ban hunting, I suggest, if there isn’t a purpose other than sport or
fun.  That should be against the law.  It’s time now.”  Aaron Sharockman, Obama Regulatory
Adviser Cass Sunstein Wants to Ban Hunting, NRA Claims in Mailer, TAMPA BAY TIMES, Jun. 13,
2012, 2012 WLNR 12452458; see also id. (quoting NRA executive vice president Wayne
LaPierre as saying that “Sunstein is a radical animal rights extremist who makes PETA . . .
look like cheerleaders with pooper-scoopers”).
204 SPITZER, supra note 7, at 8 (noting that arms-bearing “was a key method for protec-
tion from animal predators, including bears, panthers, and wolves”).
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commenting on the language of what would become the Second
Amendment:
[T]hen their will be no Dispute Between the people and rulers in that may
be secured the right to keep arms for Common and Extraordinary Occations
such as to secure ourselves against the wild Beast and also to amuse us by
fowling and for our Defence against a Common Enemy.205
Nasson describes arms-bearing as both a means of recreation and of
defense against animals.  Michael O’Shea notes that Heller protects “the right
to possess and carry arms in case of confrontation,”206 and argues, in the
context of hunting, that “[i]t is not far-fetched to argue that this right should
extend to at least some ‘confrontations’ with nonhuman animals.”207  This
makes sense, at least for “confrontations” in which people defend themselves
against animals rather than hunting them.  Jurisprudentially speaking, it is
hard to imagine that the Second Amendment would protect the right to bear
arms against human threats, but not against animal ones.  Indeed, at oral
argument in Heller Justice Kennedy referred to “the right of people living in
the wilderness to protect themselves” and the right of “the remote settler to
defend himself and his family against hostile Indian tribes and outlaws,
wolves and bears and grizzlies and things like that.”208  This locates animal
confrontation within the self-defense “core” of the Amendment.  It does not
involve a right to hunt.
People also sometimes hunt for food.209  And like self-defense against
animals, this form of gun usage (assuming that it can properly be called
arms-bearing210) has a long history tracing back at least to the Founding
era.211  Even the staunchest gun regulation advocates recognize that guns
205 Halbrook, supra note 5, at 201 (quoting Letter from Samuel Nasson to George
Thatcher (Jul. 9, 1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS 261 (Helen E. Veit et al.
eds., 1991)); see also United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 253 (5th Cir. 2001) (same);
George A. Mocsary, Note, Explaining Away the Obvious: The Infeasibility of Characterizing the
Second Amendment as a Nonindividual Right, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2113, 2128 (2008) (same).
206 O’Shea, Defensive Arms, supra note 116, at 369 (quoting District of Columbia v. Hel-
ler, 554 U.S. 570, 592).  The quoted passage actually refers to “weapons,” not “arms,”
though for present purposes nothing necessarily turns on the distinction.  Heller, 554 U.S.
at 592; see also Heller, 554 U.S. at 646 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“No party or amicus urged
this interpretation; the Court appears to have fashioned it out of whole cloth.”).
207 O’Shea, Defensive Arms, supra note 116, at 369.
208 Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, 30, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570
(2008) (No. 07-290).
209 Dwight Garner, A New Breed of Hunters Shoots, Eats and Tells, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/02/books/new-breed-of-hunter-shoots-eats-and-
writes.html; see also JAMES A. SWAN, IN DEFENSE OF HUNTING 17–19 (1995) (reporting results
of Yale University survey finding that 45.5% of hunters hunt for meat, 38.5% hunt for sport
or hobby, and 17% for enjoyment in being out in nature); SPITZER, supra note 7, at 9.
210 See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
211 Bissell, supra note 103, at 813 (“In that [colonial] society, people hunted for
food.”); see also LEVY, supra note 131, at 139 (“Hunting was necessary for meat.”). But see
JAN E. DIZARD, GOING WILD: HUNTING, ANIMAL RIGHTS, AND THE CONTESTED MEANING OF
NATURE 96 (rev. ed. 1999) (“Though modern hunters like to imagine the colonial period
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were once common for this purpose.212  Still today, many hunters, like many
fishermen, prefer to eat what they kill.  Some might even say that they need to
do so for sustenance.  But in the unlikely event that such a person were pros-
ecuted for violating a gun control law, the most natural legal defenses would
be the doctrines of necessity or justification,213 not the Second
Amendment.214
In sum, the strongest case for constitutional protection of hunting and
recreational shooting is that they are important—or, better yet, necessary—
to the successful exercise of the core Second Amendment right of armed self-
defense.  But whatever the strength of this case, it is limited in scope.  At
most, it provides a reason to extend some protection to those activities under
some limited circumstances.
III. DISENTANGLING HUNTING FROM THE SECOND AMENDMENT
The preceding discussion has shown that the case for a robust Second
Amendment right to hunt is tenuous, and that the strongest argument for
any right extends only to a limited set of circumstances and provides modest
protections.  That conclusion raises a new and difficult set of questions.
What does it mean to say that hunting is unprotected, or less protected than
other forms of gun possession and use?  What of the many millions of people
who own guns for hunting and self-defense purposes?215  Are high-powered
hunting rifles “in common use” for purposes of the Second Amendment, or
must they be excluded from consideration on the basis that (as many gun
advocates argued in Heller) they are ill suited for self-defense?  These are
hard questions to answer, precisely because hunting has become so thor-
as a golden age, a time when game was extraordinarily abundant and hunting was cele-
brated as a manly art, the fact is that the early settlers, though dependent upon game for
survival, fretted about the carnal pleasures afforded by the hunt.”).
212 Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 128, at 14 n.66 (“[F]rontier life and the need for
self-sufficiency created a climate in which almost everyone had guns, whether to hunt food
or to fight off bandits and Indians.”).
213 These doctrines have, for example, been used to protect those who trespass or steal
to save their own lives.  State v. Davenport, 973 S.W.2d 283, 287 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998)
(“[T]he necessity defense would bar a trespass conviction for a hiker, stranded in a snow-
storm, who spends the night in a vacant cabin rather than risking death sleeping in the
open.” (alteration in original) (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-609 cmt. (TENN. SEN-
TENCING COMM’N 1989))); Shaun P. Martin, The Radical Necessity Defense, 73 U. CIN. L. REV.
1527, 1550 n.97, 1558 (2005) (citing Davenport for the proposition that “[n]ecessity claims
clearly authorize, in an appropriate case, the theft of food to avoid starvation”).
214 See, e.g., United States v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 1996) (supporting justifica-
tion defense for a felon in possession).
215 Cook et al., supra note 10, at 1047 (“[M]ost people who have acquired guns for self-
protection are also hunters and target shooters.”); see also NSSF Survey Tracker, HUNTER-
SURVEY.COM (Sept. 2011), http://www.nssf.org/share/PDF/0911Survey_Tracker.pdf
(reporting that 50.8% of hunters and shooters who purchased a firearm in July 2011
bought handguns).
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oughly interwoven with American gun culture—picking out its single thread
is a challenge.
Whatever its constitutionality, a flat ban on hunting is difficult to imag-
ine as a political matter.216  The practical impact of hunting’s lack of consti-
tutional salience would therefore be most likely to appear in the ripple
effects it has on other areas of gun regulation.  Subtracting hunting interests
from other Second Amendment arguments could significantly alter their
weight.  For example, gun-rights advocates often say that state-level preemp-
tion laws—which forbid or limit local gun regulation—are necessary to pro-
tect hunters and sport shooters who want to transport their guns from place
to place.217  But if these activities lack constitutional salience, then the
debate is largely one over convenience and the desire of recreational gun
users to be exempt from local laws.  That may be a political winner, but it is
not a strong Second Amendment argument.
Removing hunting from the scale might also be significant with regard
to restrictions on particular classes of weapons. Heller held that prohibitions
of “dangerous and unusual weapons” are “presumptively lawful” under the
Second Amendment.218 Heller also indicated that the Second Amendment’s
definition of “Arms” does not cover “weapons not typically possessed by law-
abiding citizens for lawful purposes.”219  This “common use” test has been
central to many recent cases.220
The connection, or lack thereof, between hunting and the Second
Amendment could play a role in these disputes.  The common use test does
not count all guns that are commonly owned—if a gun is not “typically pos-
sessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes”221 it can be banned not-
withstanding its widespread use.  Self-defense clearly counts as a “lawful
purpose” when applying this test.222  Whether hunting should count as well is
somewhat less clear.  To be sure, it is generally “lawful,” albeit subject to regu-
lation.  But it seems unlikely that all non-prohibited purposes are constitu-
216 See Paul Finkelman, “A Well Regulated Militia”: The Second Amendment in Historical
Perspective, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 195, 236 (2000) (“Could Congress ban hunting rifles?  It
would be politically impossible and constitutionally absurd, although it would be possible
and reasonable to ban hunting, and hunting rifles, in national parks.”).
217 See, e.g., July 2012 Political Report: “On Capitol Hill and Beyond, The NRA Fights for
Hungers’ Rights”, NRA INST. FOR LEGIS. ACTION (June 26, 2012), https://www.nraila.org/
articles/20120626/july-2012-political-report-on-capitol-hill-and-beyond-the-nra-fights-for-
hunters-rights.
218 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627, 627 n.25 (2008).
219 Id. at 625.
220 See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 688 F.3d 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (upholding conviction
for possession of a homemade machine gun); United States v. Shaw, 670 F.3d 360 (1st Cir.
2012) (upholding conviction under the Federal Firearms Act for possession of a sawed-off
shotgun); People v. Liscotti, 162 Cal. Rptr. 3d 225 (2013) (upholding conviction for posses-
sion of a “billy”).
221 Heller, 554 U.S. at 625.
222 Id. at 629 (“Whatever the reason, handguns are the most popular weapon chosen by
Americans for self-defense in the home, and a complete prohibition of their use is
invalid.”).
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tionally salient.  It makes more sense to say that these purposes are relevant
to Second Amendment coverage when they have some connection to the
Second Amendment’s own core concerns, which—as shown above—do not
include hunting.  At the very least, it is plausible that common use for periph-
eral purposes like hunting should “count” less than use for self-defense.
Consider the class of guns commonly referred to as assault weapons.
These are semi-automatic rifles with certain features—a telescoping stock,
pistol grip, or the ability to be converted quickly to automatic firing—that
make them appear “military” and, in many people’s minds, more dangerous.
Many high profile mass shootings have been perpetuated with AR–15s—New-
town, Aurora, and the DC sniper murders, for example.223  As a result, and
despite the fact that assault weapon murders represent a small proportion of
overall gun deaths,224 assault weapons regulation has received extensive
political and constitutional attention.
Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of the constitutionality of regu-
lating assault weapons is that they are precisely the kind of “dangerous and
unusual” weapon whose prohibition Heller calls “presumptively lawful.”225
Justice Scalia himself suggested in Heller that it would be permissible to ban
M–16s,226 and the Court has elsewhere described the AR–15 as “the civilian
version of the military’s M–16 rifle.”227  And yet the case for describing
assault weapons as dangerous and unusual is not so clear-cut as it might
appear.  AR–15s can be purchased at Wal-Mart,228 and there are at least half
a million of them registered with the federal government229—more than the
hundreds of thousands of machine guns that Justice Scalia clearly suggested
223 George Zornick, How Walmart Helped Make the Newtown Shooter’s AR–15 the Most Popu-
lar Assault Weapon in America, NATION (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.thenation.com/article/
how-walmart-helped-make-newtown-shooters-ar-15-most-popular-assault-weapon-america/.
224 See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Crime in the United States
2012: Uniform Crime Reports, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/
crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/tables/20tabledatadecpdf (showing that 322 out of 8,855 firearm
murders in 2012 were committed with rifles, or about 3.6%).
225 LAWRENCE E. ROSENTHAL & ADAM WINKLER, REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE IN AMERICA
232 (Daniel W. Webster & Jon S. Vernick eds., 2013) (“Just as ‘dangerous and unusual
weapons’ like machine guns, which can also be used for self-defense, can be restricted
consistent with the Second Amendment, so can assault weapons.”); Geoffrey R. Stone, The
Second Amendment, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 30, 2013, 10:35 AM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey-r-stone/the-second-amendment_b_2581625.html (last
updated Apr. 1, 2013) (arguing that restrictions on the manufacture and sale of high-
capacity ammunition magazines and assault weapons are likely valid due to the presump-
tively lawful language of Heller). But see Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1260 (“We are not aware of
evidence that prohibitions on either semi-automatic rifles or large-capacity magazines are
longstanding and thereby deserving of a presumption of validity.”).
226 Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 (indicating that M–16 rifles are exemplary of “dangerous and
unusual weapons”).
227 Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 603 (1994).
228 Zornick, supra note 223.
229 BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Fire-
arms Commerce in the United States: Annual Statistical Update 2012, at 14, http://www.atf.gov/
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are “dangerous and unusual.”230  Some industry groups say that the AR–15
Bushmaster is the fastest-selling model gun in the country, even after (in fact,
especially after) Newtown.231
What is less clear is why these rifles are owned, and to what purposes they
are being put.  Are they the kinds of constitutionally salient uses that should
count for purposes of the common use test?  The DC Circuit faced this very
question in Heller II, which involved the District of Columbia’s ban on assault
weapons.  The majority concluded that such weapons are commonly owned,
but was unsure whether they are useful for the kinds of lawful purposes pro-
tected by Heller—the court specifically mentioned self-defense and
hunting.232
Though precise figures are hard to find,233 it is plausible that AR–15s
are in common use for hunting but not for self-defense.  Gun regulation
advocates often say that assault weapons are not appropriate for hunting,234
files/publications/firearms/050412-firearms-commerce-in-the-us-annual-statistical-update-
2012.pdf.
230 Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570
(2008) (No. 07-290).
231 NRA INST. FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION, Not Quite All “The Facts” About the AR–15, NRA-
ILA.ORG (Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.nraila.org/news-issues/articles/2013/11/not-quite-
all-the-facts-about-the-ar-15.aspx (noting that it “is certainly the case, based upon recent
firearm manufacturer reports” that “the AR-15 is ‘America’s most popular rifle’”).  Gun
sales typically spike in the wake of a prominent gun-related tragedy like Newtown.  The
most common explanation for this is that gun owners fear the threat of gun regulation.
Natasha Singer, The Most Wanted Gun in America, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2013), http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/business/the-ar-15-the-most-wanted-gun-in-america.html
(noting that “[s]ince the massacre in Newtown, Conn., in December, the AR–15 . . . has
been selling fast here and across the nation” likely due to significantly increased demand
in anticipation of gun control legislation).
232 Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1261 (“We think it clear enough in the record that semi-auto-
matic rifles and magazines holding more than ten rounds are indeed in ‘common use’ . . . .
Nevertheless, based upon the record as it stands, we cannot be certain whether these weap-
ons are commonly used or are useful specifically for self-defense or hunting . . . .”).
233 O’Shea, Defensive Arms, supra note 116, at 389 n.188 (noting that “[i]t is currently
difficult to calculate with precision the number” of assault weapons sold in any given year).
234 Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 150 Regulating Assault Weapons (2013)
(testimony of Milwaukee Chief of Police Edward A. Flynn), http://www.judiciary.senate.
gov/imo/media/doc/2-27-13FlynnTestimony.pdf (“Assault weapons are not built for
sportsmen.  Assault weapons are not built to hunt deer or elk or bear or other large game.
Assault weapons are built to inflict violence against humans.”); Stephanie Ebbert &
Michael Levenson, Brown Reverses Stance on Gun Laws, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 19, 2012), https://
www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2012/12/19/senator-elect-elizabeth-warren-backs-
assault-weapon-ban/0rgmqDijV6xoVNJF2XF59O/story.html (quoting then-candidate Eliz-
abeth Warren as saying that she learned to shoot when she was in grade school, but “no
one needs military-grade assault weapons to hunt”); Reid’s Remarks on Assault Weapons Ban
Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/18/us/politics/reids-
remarks-on-assault-weapons-ban-vote.html (“Where I come from, people own guns as a
matter of course for self-defense and for hunting.  But I have always had trouble under-
standing why people need assault weapons to hunt or to protect their homes.”).
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and denigrate hunters who use them.235  But many hunters and gun-rights
advocates claim that so-called assault rifles, including the AR–15, have
become common for hunters and target shooters.  Michael O’Shea writes
that “AR–15 rifles are now mainstream equipment for so-called ‘varmint’
hunters, who must make rapid, long-range shots on small targets such as prai-
rie dogs and coyotes.”236  David Kopel and Richard Gardner similarly say that
“so-called ‘assault weapons’ are used for competitive target shooting, for
hunting, for ‘plinking,’ and for collecting.”237
At the same time, many gun-rights supporters have argued strenuously
that assault weapons are not appropriate guns for self-defense purposes.  The
laws at issue in Heller effectively banned handguns, but permitted private
individuals to own an arsenal of long guns.  Opponents of the law maintained
that rifles are not sufficient for self-defense.238 Heller itself noted that “the
American people have considered the handgun to be the quintessential self-
235 Christopher Keating, Dodd, Back in Connecticut, Says Colorado Shootings Show Need for
More Restrictions on Weapons, HARTFORD COURANT (July 23, 2012), http://articles.courant.
com/2012-07-23/news/hc-dodd-0724-20120723_1_assault-weapons-dodd-gun-restrictions
(Sen. Christopher J. Dodd: “There’s not a decent hunter I know who would hunt anything
with an assault weapon.”); Fox News Sunday (Fox News television broadcast Dec. 30, 2012)
(Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) stated: “I mean, no hunter, in my view, worth his or her
salt, would use an assault weapon to hunt, and, they’re not necessarily good defensive of
weapons.”); Talk of the Nation: Analysis: Politics of Guns and the Gun Industry (NPR broadcast
May 15, 2003) (Mike Barnes, President, Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence, stated:
“You know, hunters don’t need the semiautomatic, high-powered assault weapons to hunt
unless they are very bad hunters.”).
236 O’Shea, Defensive Arms, supra note 116, at 388 n.182; see also Abrams, supra note 98,
at 499 (“Furthermore, some features that make a weapon ‘military-like’ and, consequently,
more attractive to drug dealers, also enhance the weapon’s use for hunting.”); O’Shea,
Defensive Arms, supra note 116, at 389 n.188 (noting that “[i]t is currently difficult to calcu-
late with precision the number” of assault weapons sold in any given year (citing industry
publications)); Ray Long & Rafael Guerrero, House Lawmakers Clash Over Assault Weapons
Ban, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 28, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-02-28/news/ct-
met-illinois-assault-weapons-ban-0301-20130301_1_assault-weapons-high-powered-guns-
gun-homicides (“We’re trying to pass a bill [banning assault weapons] to make us feel
good, and it isn’t going to do a thing . . . . I deer hunt with an assault weapon.”).
237 David B. Kopel & Richard E. Gardner, The Sullivan Principles: Protecting the Second
Amendment from Civil Abuse, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 737, 755 (1995).
238 See, e.g., Brief for Amici Curiae Disabled Veterans for Self-Defense and Kestra
Childers at 29–30, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (No. 07-290) (noting that
rifles are more dangerous to keep in the home because of their relative muzzle velocity);
Brief Amicus Curiae of the Heartland Institute at 16–17, Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (No. 07-290)
(noting that “[t]he vast majority of American gun owners prefer handguns to other fire-
arms for self-defense” and that “the FBI found that handguns accounted for over 83 per-
cent of all firearms used in legally justified defensive homicides by private citizens, while
shotguns and rifles together accounted for less than 7.5 percent of such”); Brief of Amici
Curiae Se. Legal Found., Inc. et al. at 17–21, Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (No. 07-290) (listing
reasons why “[h]igh powered rifles are not recommended for self-defense,” including (1)
the fact that dialing 911 while aiming one is difficult, (2) they are awkward to get into
action quickly, and (3) they are less useful in close quarters (internal quotations omitted)).
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defense weapon.”239  If it is true, as these arguments suggest, that long guns
are useful for hunting but not for self-defense, then the Second Amendment
protection of those guns should be correspondingly weaker.
CONCLUSION
That hunting largely falls outside the Second Amendment of course
does not mean that it is or should be illegal, only that its protection and
regulation should be left to the political process rather than the courts.240
Given the degree to which even gun control advocates go out of their way to
emphasize their commitment to hunting, the political process seems to offer
relatively significant protections to hunters.241  Areas where hunting is cul-
turally embedded will never ban it, and even the relatively stringent law
struck down in Heller permitted guns to be used for “lawful recreational pur-
poses.”242  From the perspective of the Second Amendment, of course, the
issue is not whether hunting weapons should be regulated, but whether they
can be regulated in ways that are different from self-defense weapons.  Given
hunting’s tenuous relationship to Second Amendment values, the answer is
generally yes.
At a more general level, the conclusion that hunting falls largely, and
perhaps entirely, outside the scope of the Second Amendment might make
the dysfunctional gun debate somewhat more manageable.  That debate is
largely locked up by disparate cultural visions that seem impossible to bridge.
Moreover, with hundreds of millions of guns in circulation, the problem of
appropriate and constitutional sometimes seems too big, and the Second
Amendment’s shadow too heavy.  But if roughly half of gun ownership raises
no Second Amendment issues, and has been adequately protected through
normal political processes, then perhaps there is cause for hope after all.
239 Heller, 554 U.S. at 629.
240 Miller, supra note 4, at 1350 (arguing that “hunting, trap shooting, or other public
uses of firearms” should fall outside the Second Amendment and be left to the political
process).
241 Dowd, supra note 79, at 105 n.98 (arguing that “respect for hunters’ interest groups
is a powerful influencing factor on gun control legislation”); Bob Herbert, Opinion, A
Threat We Can’t Ignore, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/20/
opinion/20herbert.html (noting that “the politicians always claim to be defending”); On
the Record: The Democratic Debate; Transcript of Democratic Candidates’ Debate in New York, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 29, 1984), http://www.nytimes.com/1984/03/29/us/record-democratic-
debate-transcript-democratic-candidates-debate-new-york.html (Rev. Jesse Jackson: “I favor
gun control.  In those areas—in the rural areas where they hunt rabbits, having guns is all
right, but in urban American they hunt people.  We need to go another way.”); see also
NAT’L SHOOTING SPORTS FOUND., AMERICANS ATTITUDES TOWARD HUNTING, FISHING AND
TARGET SHOOTING 2011 (Sept. 2011), http://www.nssf.org/PDF/research/RM_2011-Atti
tudesTowardHuntingFishingTargetShooting.pdf (reporting that 74% of American adults
have a favorable view of hunting).
242 D.C. CODE § 7-2507.02 (2001), invalidated by Heller, 554 U.S. 570.
